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ABSTRACT 	  
Water, the energizer of all life on earth, knows no boundaries. It crosses national 
borders, and links nearly forty per cent of world population together, through their 
common dependability on a transboundary water source. Transboundary water 
resources and the management of them are central points of focus in this thesis. A 
case study will present a hydropower development project in Kagera River. This river 
floats on the border between Uganda and Tanzania, and it therefore a shared resource. 
A private developer has been given the task to implement the project.  This has not 
been as easy task, as the resource is shared, and the two states have had to carry out 
several complicated negotiations in order to decide how the project should be carried 
out. Through qualitative methods, this research sets out to describe and explain he 
processes within the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project from its beginning 
towards its final agreement. This study shows how the negotiation processes of 
transboundary water resources can be carried out. Moreover, this study shows that 
water resources cannot be managed well if the involved states do not cooperate.  
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Water is an essential element for all life. It is the resource for sustaining life and 
livelihoods. No other resource can compete with the importance water has for human 
life on earth. Only water can secure the multitude of ecosystem services, support 
cultural and economic activities and ensure basic human needs (Conner et al, 2012). 
We need water for drinking, food production, hygiene, energy production, 
transportation, industry, and for the wellbeing of all ecosystems on earth. There is no 
such thing as managing water for a single purpose; all water management is based on 
navigating competing interests and is therefore multi-objective (Wolf et al, 2010). 
 
Despite the importance of water, and the enormous need for it in the world, water is a 
limited and scarce resource. Even though 70 % of the surface on planet earth is 
covered by water, only a small share of it is fresh drinking water. Of all water on 
earth, 97.5% is salt water. Of the remaining 2.5%, which is not salt water, 98.7% is 
either frozen and locked into glaciers, such as on Greenland and Antarctica, or is 
situated in underground aquifers, not accessible for humans to use (USGS, 2013). Of 
all the freshwater in the world, only 1.3 % is what can be called surface water. Most 
of this surface water exists as ice, and therefore not directly available for people to 
use. This leaves only 0.007% of the Earth’s water, found in lakes, rivers, reservoirs 
and those underground sources that are shallow enough to be tapped at an affordable 
cost, to be usable for humans. Only this amount is regularly renewed by snow and 
rainfall and is therefore accessible on a sustainable basis (University of Michigan, 
2000). 
 
Despite the share of accessible water being low, compared to the amount of water 
covering the Earth’s surface, it is still sufficient to sustain the seven billion people 
living on Earth. The ability to sustain the world population with the existing 0.007% 
of accessible water is fully possible. However, what’s problematic is that this 0.007% 
is unevenly distributed between states, and a significant amount of it is polluted, 
wasted and poorly managed. Water usage has been growing at more than twice the 
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speed of population increase during the last century. This has generated significant 
pressure on the water resources around the world (UN-Water, 2006). Climate change 
also plays the role of a major challenge in this regard. The associated changes in the 
terrestrial water cycle are likely to affect the availability and nature of natural water 
resources. Consequently, it will also affect human societies relying on them (World 
Bank, 2012). No matter if these changes and factors might lead to either dryer 
weather, or more rain, and floods, the need for a stable and good management of the 
water is essential. Additionally, effective water resources development and 
management play a fundamental role in sustainable growth in the society and in 
poverty reduction (World Bank, 2004). 
 
1.1. Sharing the Worlds Water Resources 
When water leaves the national territory of one state and crosses over the border to 
another, it becomes a transboundary resource, and therefore considerably more 
complicated to manage. These because water-related activities in one nation are likely 
to impact the water situation in another. Consequently, water-related problems can 
often only be solved through transboundary cooperation (Vollmer et al, 2009). A 
definition to transboundary water can be “freshwater resources shared by two or more 
states and comprising rivers, lakes and aquifers” (Vollmer et al, 2009). Put in 
different words, it is water that crosses national boundaries. 
 
This thesis will focus on surface water. Even though water sources in water in 
underground aquifers also can fall under this definition, the focus of this thesis will be 
on the freshwater in rivers, lakes and reservoirs, which gather and floats on the 
surface of the earth.  (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009). More specifically, the focus of 
this thesis will be on rivers and the basins they float through. 
 
There are 276 transboundary river basins in the world, accounting for roughly 60% of 
the global river flow (UN-Water, 2013). These river basins are being shared by 148 
states and are home to some 40% of the world’s population (UN-Water, 2008). These 
rivers are fundamental for the planets ecology. Without them, many ecosystems 
would have perished. Rivers shape the terrain and create wide basins and steep 
mountains. These landscapes are home to a wide variety of animals and plants. For 
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thousands of years, areas near rivers have attracted human settlements. Thus, where 
water is found, basis for life is formed and eventually, it flourishes (Shadoff and Grey 
2002).  
 
As the demand for water grows in all nations, these shared resources will increasingly 
be drawn upon to meet the challenging needs of billions of people for drinking water, 
energy, food, and industrial production. These needs leave less water, often of much 
lesser quality, to sustain ecosystems and to meet people’s future demands (Shadoff et 
al, 2008).  Consequently, if nations, and people within them do not cooperate on 
managing the water, it will not be managed in the most effective way to sustain the 
human lives and economic development (UN-Water, 2013). However, if states do 
cooperate on the management of water in river basins, the possibility of achieving 
prosperity, peace and sustainable development. 
 
Cooperation on management of water is important for ensuring sustainability of 
ecosystems, and the continuation of the life of the human kind. The importance of this 
gains great attention in the world today. An example of this can be the fact that this 
year the United Nations are targeting their attention to cooperation of water 
management, by announcing 2013 as the official year international water cooperation. 
 
1.2. The Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project 
The Kikagati/Murongo hydropower project is the story about a 16 MW power station, 
which is to be constructed on the Kagera River, on a location where the river forms 
the border between the two African states, Uganda and Tanzania. Work on this 
project started in 2005, when a private a private developer applied for permission 
from the Ugandan authorities to construct a small hydropower station. Permission was 
granted and all looked promising for the construction of the power station. However, 
Tanzania had not been included in the planning, even though they own half of the 
river on which the power station was to be constructed.  As the planning of the project 
evolved, there was an eventual need for approving the planned project with the 
Tanzanian authorities. Tanzania then got involved, but the continuation of work with 
the project became described as challenging.  
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The project of Kikagati/Murongo is the first transboundary cooperation project to find 
place between Tanzania and Uganda. Additionally, this project is the first project of 
its kind in Africa, where a private developer is responsible for the construction in a 
river that constitutes the border between two sovereign states. Now, half way in the 
year 2013, the main part of negotiations and agreements are falling into place, and the 
implementation of the project can soon begin.  
 
Since the project started as a unilateral Ugandan project, it was first named “Kikagati 
Hydropower Project”. This name comes from the area on the Ugandan side of the 
border where the hydropower station is to be situated. When Tanzania became 
involved in the project, the name changed to “Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower 
Project”. Murongo is the name on the Tanzanian side of the area at the project site. 
The new name marked that this was now a project between two states.  
 
Even though the most commonly used name for the project, among many of the actors 
involved, is “Kikagati Hydropower Project”, the name used in this thesis will be the 
official “Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project”. As for the planned hydropower 
station, the name will be “Kikagati Power Station”, or in some cases even referred to 
as simply “Kikagati”. 
 
1.3. Research Objective and Questions 
This study will have emphasis on giving a clearer picture of a hydropower project 
where to neighboring nations have had to cooperate on the implementation and thus 
serve as a real life example of transboundary water management. The research 
objective of this study is therefore “To describe and explain the process within the 
project from the start to a final agreement, in order to enable a better understanding 
of the realities of the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project”  
 
In order to being able to follow this research objective, three research questions are 
created. These questions will be answered throughout the study. 
 
Research question 1: What role have the different actors in the project played, and 
how have they affected the project 
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Research question 2: What challenges have there been for the project?  
 
Research question 3: What is the motivation for the states to cooperate and reach an 
agreement?  
 
1.4. Structure of the Study 
This research consists of eight chapters, including concluding remarks. The two 
primary chapters give an introduction to the rest of the thesis. Chapter 1 gives an 
introduction to the meaning of water and presents the term transboundary water. The 
Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project, objective of the study, and the research 
questions are also presented in this chapter. Chapter 2 gives an introduction to the 
study context. The two partner states, Uganda and Tanzania, are presented. 
Furthermore, a description of the electricity supply in the two countries is given, and 
the River Kagera and project site are described. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
framework of this study. Here, relevant theory related to transboundary water is 
presented. The main focus will be given to cooperation on transboundary water as this 
is the most relevant theory and feature for the case of Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower 
Project. Chapter 4 presents the research methodology, which is qualitative method. 
Here I outline the reason to why I chose this type of research method, how the 
research was designed and the various techniques of data collection I have used. 
Chapters 5 and 6 look at the findings of this study. These findings are presented and 
analyzed. Chapter 7 looks at the main barriers to, and the main benefits from, the 
Kikagati/Murongo project. These benefits and barriers are presented and discussed. 
Chapter 8 presents concluding remarks on this thesis. 
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Chapter 2. STUDY CONTEXT 
 
2.1. Country Profiles 
 
TANZANIA 
Tanzania is the largest East-African nation and is located on the Southeast part of the 
African continent. The country’s geography is one of the most varied and unique in 
the world, as it contains Africa’s highest peak, lakes and natural parks. Tanzania 
shares border with Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and 
Uganda. The eastern border of Tanzania is washed by the Indian Ocean (Geographia, 
2005). Northeast of Tanzania is mountainous and includes Kilimanjaro and Meru. 
Further west, we find the large Lake Victoria, situated on the border between Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania. The Northwestern part of the Tanzanian territory the Kagera 
river is situated on the border between Uganda and Tanzania. Tropical savannas and 
warm climate cover vast parts of Tanzania (Kortner et al 1994a). The country’s 
climate ranges from temperate climate at the elevated centre to a more hot and humid 
temperature on the coast.  
 
Politics 
The country of Tanganyika received its independence from Britain in 1961. The states 
known as Tanzania was formed in 1964 as Tanganyika and Zanzibar went into a 
union. Later, Zanzibar became a semi-autonomous state with an own president 
(Leraand, 2013). From 1963 to the beginning of 1990s, Tanzania was a one-party 
state. During this period, the government carried out an economic and political 
program that would make Tanzania a socialistic state.  
 
With the newly acquired independence and new political situation, Tanzania has held 
a visible regional profile both regionally and on the African continent in general 
(Leraand, 2013). The country’s last election was in 2010.  CCM and Jakaya Mirisho 
Kikwete were re-elected as the ruling party and President. The government has many 
challenges, which they have promised to deal with during their time in power. Among 
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these challenges there is severe corruption, energy infrastructure and effectiveness in 
the public sector. Additionally, President Kikwete has promised to change the current 
constitution, which gives a vast amount of power to the president, in time for the next 
election in 2015 (Utenriksdepartementet, 2013a).  
 
Economy 
Tanzania’s economy has experienced a relatively steady and high growth the last 
decade. The sources of this growth are situated in different sectors. The main drivers 
of the economy have been telecommunications, tourism, mining and construction. 
Additionally, government spending has contributed greatly to growth, in contrast to 
private investments. Inflation has been disturbing the Tanzanian economy since the 
year of 2011. Still, the outlook for Tanzania’s growth looks bright despite the 
inflation and a rather high ranking of the corruption list (Transparency International, 
2013). Nevertheless, even though the economic future of Tanzania looks good, the 
state’s economy is vulnerable to international economic shocks and recessions; this 
might cause great problems for this steadily growing African state (World Bank, 
2013c). Additionally, Tanzania with its 48,262,000 citizens (CAI World 
Factbook, 2013a) is still one of poorest countries in the world, ranking 152 out of 
186 on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2013) 
 
UGANDA 
Uganda is situated in the middle of the African continent and is landlocked in 
between South-Sudan, Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya. Nevertheless, lakes 
cover almost a fifth of the country’s areal. Among them is the Lake Victoria, which 
Uganda shares with Kenya and Tanzania. The climate in Uganda is tropical, but 
somewhat limited by the countries high altitude (Kortner et al, 1994b). The country is 
affected by a large biodiversity, and diversity in landscape. There are mountains and 
valleys. In the west, there is rainforest, while plateau valleys dominate the east.   
 
Politics 
Uganda is a republic governed by president Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Uganda has 
ever since the independence from Britain, in 1962, been troubled by political and 
military instability. Both president Milton Obote’s and Idi Amin’s regimes have been 
authoritative and been marked by extensive use of violence and conflicts (Haslie, 
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2013). The current president took power through a coup d’etat in 1986, in the 
following time he has been re-elected through national elections. The most recent re-
election of Museveni took place in 2011, as he became elected to govern for five new 
years. A constitution from 2005 makes it possible for the president to become re-
elected for an indefinite amount of times.  
 
Uganda’s relation to the neighbouring states has at times been strained, especially 
with DR Congo. Nowadays, however, the relations between Uganda and the 
surrounding nations are stable (Leraand, 2013). The development of the hydropower 
project with Tanzania can be an example of this improvement of neighbouring 
relations. 
 
Economy 
In the years between 1990 and the new millennium, Uganda has managed to establish 
a strong record of prudent macroeconomic management and structural reforms. For 
the fact, Uganda was one of the first Sub-Saharan Africa states to establish a liberal 
and market-oriented economic policy in the late 1980’s. In the years after the new 
millennium, Uganda has experienced an economic growth that has managed to 
withstand a global economic crisis and some other exogenous shocks (World Bank, 
2013d). Although, great challenges with the high level of corruption within the 
national political system troubles the Ugandan economy. Additionally there is a 
yearly inflation rate at over 15% this makes the Ugandan Shilling weaker 
(Utenriksdepartementet, 2013b). Also, Uganda with a population of close to 35 
million people (CIA World Factbook, 2013b) is, along with Tanzania, one of the 
poorest countries in the world, rating as number 161 on the Human Development 
Index list (UNDP, 2013). 
 
Relationship between the States 
Tanzania and Uganda have for a long time had a good bilateral relationship. 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that under the rule of Idi Amin in Uganda, the 
relations between the states were filled with conflict. The situation escalated to Amin 
attacking Tanzania in October 1978. However, the battle ended up in Tanzania, along 
with Ugandan exiles, defeat of Amin and his aggressive regime. After the end of the 
war in 1979, the bilateral relations between Uganda and Tanzania grew steadily 
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towards stability and friendliness (McKenna, 2011). In 2001 the bilateral relations 
reached a new level of cooperation, as the East African Community became 
established (EAC, 2013). In 2004, a customs union was established between 
Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. These three states also created a military cooperation 
through the East African Stability Force (Leraand, 2013). The work within the EAC 
has continued, something that has led the integration and cooperation between the 
states to become stronger.  
 
2.2. The electricity supply in Tanzania and Uganda 
Both Uganda and Tanzania experiencing severe power shortage at the same time as 
there is a rapid growth in the demand for more electricity. At the moment only a small 
part of the population has access to electricity. Uganda has an electrification rate at 
approximately 12 percent (ERA, 2012) while in Tanzania approximately 14 percent 
(World Bank, 2013a) have access to electricity. At the same time there is an estimated 
annual demand growth at 8-10 percent for more electric power in both the countries in 
the years to come (African Development Fund, 2010; Dhalla, 2011). There are great 
challenges with covering the demands, as there is a major amount of black outs in 
both of the states. Numbers from 2010 show that there was an installed generation 
capacity in Tanzania is 887 MW (Maposa, 2011). While the number of installed 
generation capacity in Uganda is 573 MW (Dhalla, 2011). There has however not 
been possible to fully use this capacity. In Tanzania, for instance, there has been a lot 
of drought the last years. A large part of Tanzania's electricity is generated from four 
hydro-powered stations, however the increased intensity and occurrence of droughts 
has significantly reduced Tanzania's generating capacity (Maposa, 2011). To 
compensate for these problems, and the increasing demand for electric power, both of 
the states have had to expand the use of thermal power stations. An increase in the 
number of these types of power plants is not good, as they have a negative effect on 
the environment at the same time as they generate electricity with a much higher cost 
per kWh compared to hydropower. Yet another negative effect of thermal power 
plants is that they have a negative effect for the state economy as the two countries 
governments subsidize a large share of the power. The subsidization makes it possible 
for the citizens to buy the electricity. This share tends to vary, and is dependent on 
several factors, like share size of the hydropower and thermal power, as well as the 
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price for petroleum, which fuels the thermal plants. Share size of the subsidies during 
the last years has been approximately 30 percent in Tanzania (Hoogeveen, 2007) and 
45 percent (Dhalla, 2011) in Uganda. Consequently, both of the states need to 
increase the production of environmental friendly and cost effective power in the 
future. For more details about the electricity production in Uganda and Tanzania, see 
table 1 and table 2. 
 
Table 1. Uganda Electricity: Key Information for 2006 and 2009 
Uganda 2006 2009 
Total energy production 1530 MWh 2127 MWh 
Total from renewable % 77 % 61 % 
Total from thermal % 23 % 39 % 
System losses % 32 % 28.2 % 
  Source: Dhalla, 2011; ERA, 2012 
 
Table 2. Tanzania Electricity: Key information for 2004 and 2009 
Tanzania 2004 2009 
Total energy production 2089 GWh 4164 GWh 
Total from renewable % 81,5 % 63 % 
Total from thermal % 18,5 % 37 % 
System losses % 20,7 % 21,5 % 
Source: World Bank, 2013a 
 2.3. Kagera River Basin 
River Nile is the world’s longest river, flowing for more than 6,650 km from its 
origins in Rwanda and Burundi to Egypt at the Mediterranean Sea (Salman, 2013). 
The Nile is extending over 11 countries that share the river, has a basin area of more 
than three million km2, in addition to covering one-tenth of the African continent 
(Collins, 2002) About 300 million people live by the Nile, or depend on the waters of 
the river for survival. The number of people depending on the Nile is expected to 
reach 500 million by 2030. 
 
The two district basins, White Nile and the Blue Nile, make up the Nile River system. 
The White Nile has originates in the springs rising from the hills of Rwanda and 
Burundi. These springs combine and form the Kagera River, which with its 34 percent 
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of the annual tributary inflow, is the largest of the rivers that drains into Lake Victoria 
(GWP, 2011). 
 
The Kagera basin has a general elevation of 1,200 – 1,600 m but rises above 2,500 m 
in the west, with peaks reaching 4,500 m. The whole Kagera basin covers 
approximately 60,000 km2 in the four countries of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and 
Tanzania. There are two main rain seasons in the basin, one from February to May, 
and one from September to November (Dumont, 2009). Rainfall is less than 1,000 
mm over most of the eastern half of the basin but increases to over 1,800 mm in the 
west. It is in the west the most of the runoff is generated (WSP, 2003). Much of the 
Kagera Basin is characterized by the number of shallow lakes and swamps, which 
play an important part in the natural regulation of the river. This however, creates 
some concern because it leads to water loss due to evaporation (Tvedt, 2010). 
Estimations show that Kagera River Basin supports the livelihoods of some 16.5 
million people. Thus, the settlement patterns within the catchments are described as 
having a high population density (FAO, 2013). The basin lies within the territory of 
four of the world’s poorest countries, and except in the major cities like Kigali, the 
basin is described to be economically depressed and neglected in terms of 
development (WSP, 2003). Most people live in the rural areas and depend on farming, 
fishing and herding to maintain their subsistence. 
 
High population concentrations in the catchment have led to extensive clearing of 
forests and pressure on agricultural land, resulting in land degradation and loss of soil 
fertility (World Bank, 2009). This unsustainable practice for land management has led 
to widespread land cover depletion, and there is god as no ongoing reforestation 
activities (FAO, 2013). Soil erosion and an increased nutrient accumulation in the 
river, as well as in Lake Victoria, have lead to serious problems of eutrophication and 
water hyacinth (NBI, 2013). Although, if managed properly the, Kagera basin holds 
great possibilities for development and growth. Good management of the river might 
create benefits such as increase of food production, industrial development, 
transportation, energy availability, environmental conservation and other related 
sustainable development activities (NBI, 2013). It can also be mentioned that the 
basin once had technical committee, the Kagera Basin Organization, which was to 
coordinate the regional plans in the basin. This Organization did not become as 
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expected and hoped for, based on the internal turmoil as well as ethnic and political 
conflicts between the member states (Tvedt, 2010). The Kagera Basin Organization 
was therefore dissolved in 2004. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of the region and project location. 
       
 
2.4. Location of the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project 
The Kikagati Hydropower Plant will be located on the Kagera River some 200 km 
upstream Lake Victoria (Bugten, 2010). This is an area where the river actually flows 
on, and demarcates, the border between Uganda and Tanzania. Earlier, there was a 4 
MW power station. This station was totally demolished in 1979 during the war 
between Tanzania and Uganda. The area lies 1250 meters above the sea line 
(Koksæter, 2011) and the mean annual river flow at the location where the power 
station will be built is estimated to be 194 m3/s (Bugten, 2010).  
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On the Ugandan side, in Kikagati sub-county, the estimated number of people is 
approximately 58 100. A similar estimate shows that there are approximately 11 100 
people living on the Tanzanian side, in the area of Murongo. (Ndyabarema et al, 
2011). The area is generally lacking water resources, except from Kagera River, 
which is the main source of water in the area. It can also be mentioned that the 
literacy rate is relatively high, despite this being a poor area. On the Ugandan side 71 
percent of the population above 18 year are literate and on the Tanzanian side 72 
percent are literate.  
 
Investigation done by NEWPLAN in 2011 showed that only 11.2% of the inhabitants 
on the Ugandan side were connected to the electricity grid, despite most of the 
population wanting to be connected to the grid. When asked about why they where 
not connected, the inhabitants responded that the costs of connecting to the grid are to 
high, and that they have more pressing needs to cover. The Tanzanian side is not yet 
connected to the grid. The area is located far away from possible connection points in 
Tanzania, and it will be very costly to build a connecting power line. The area has 
therefore not been electrified since an old 4 MW power station, which used to supply 
the area, was destroyed in the war in 1979 (Ndyabarema et al, 2011). Based on this, 
the Tanzanian inhabitants mostly use firewood and charcoal for cooking and paraffin 
for lightning. Some people use solar panels, however, these are mostly used in 
restaurants trading centers, and even then, only for lights and refrigerating. On the 
Ugandan side, firewood, charcoal and paraffin are being used in the villages, whereas 
solar panels, paraffin and electricity from the national grid is more often used in the 
town and trading centers.  
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Chapter 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The following section contains key features and theory, surrounding transboundary 
water management. The main focus will be given to cooperation on transboundary 
water, as this is the most relevant theory and feature for the case of Kikagati/Murongo 
Hydropower Project.  
 
3.1. The Hydrological Interdependence in Transboundary Water 
Basins  
Rivers, who crosses national borders and becomes transboundary, binds both 
livelihoods of people and nation states. Take the Mekong River as an example. It is 
one of the greatest river-systems in the world. Mekong generates power in its upper 
reaches in China. It sustains rich production of fishery systems, which in turn support 
the livelihoods of more than 60 million peoples in the lower reaches of its basin 
(Anton and Shelton, 2011). 
 
States that share transboundary waters are bound by a hydrological interdependence 
(Jägerskog and Phillips, 2009). When underground aquifers, rivers and lakes cross 
national boundaries of states, they become committed by recourses that are partly 
theirs and partly someone else’s. This creates three main reasons for concern between 
the involved parties. The first issue of concern is the issue of sovereignty. The second 
is national security. The third is territorial integrity. 
 
As a productive recourse, water is distinctive in that it can never be managed for a 
single use. This is because it flows between users and sectors (Anton and Shelton, 
2011). This means that the consumption of a common pool resource, like water, by 
one user will leave less for others (Rowland, 2005). Thus in a way, water can be 
interpreted as a null-sum-resource. 
 
Nation states, that share transboundary water resources, are linked by a set of complex 
factors such as environmental policies, economy as well as security. The mentioned 
factors can both be a force for peace and conflict among the states that share water 
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resources. However, it is the political factor that decides how the co-management 
takes place in the end (UNDP, 2006). Especially in water-scarce river basins a 
hydrological-interdependence can create a reason for conflict. 
 
Transboundary waters create the need for close attention and management that is well 
thought through at the national political level. An effective governance of the water is 
an increasingly recognized tool for addressing fundamental challenges that might 
occur between hydrologically interdependent states (Jägerskog and Phillips, 2009). 
Consequently, the absence of cooperation between the interdependent states makes it 
difficult to achieve optimization of the human progress in respect to the water 
resources (UNDP 2006). Because water has the characteristic of being a flowing 
recourse, which is not permanently situated in one place, its use in one place might 
affect its use in another place. In other words if one actor pollutes the water, all of the 
other actors downstream will be affected. 
 
Transboundary water links the states of which territory it crosses together.  Because 
even though the states are sovereign, and in theory independent from one another, 
their environments, livelihoods and growth becomes connected to the water they 
share, and consequently to each other.  For instance, problems might occur if 
upstream users dam up the water for hydropower purposes while the states 
downstream need it for agriculture. Thus, the use of the water upstream determines 
the options for water management downstream.  A good example here is the Toktogul 
reservoir in Kyrgyzstan. During times of the USSR, most of the water in Syr Darya 
was released during the summer for irrigation of the large agricultural areas in 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As compensation, Kyrgyzstan received gas from 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan so that the Kirghiz energy demands were covered during 
wintertime (Hodgsen, 2010). After the fall of the Soviet Union, this system was 
dissolved. This resulted in Kyrgyzstan using the water in Toktogul reservoir for 
energy production during wintertime. Consequently, a lot of water was released from 
the reservoir during wintertime, and very little during summertime. This resulted in 
major problems for the agricultural areas in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Hodgsen, 
2010). 
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Nevertheless, the consequences might greater if the agriculture areas are located 
upstream. Even though it is common to collect and store water in large reservoirs for 
use in hydropower production, the water is not used up by being sent through the 
turbines. The only water-loss, which happens in this regard, is the loss due to 
evaporation. Although, in areas with much hot weather, the water loss due to 
evaporation might in fact be significant (Rekacewicz, 2009). However, irrigation for 
agriculture has been and still is the number one water consumer, and accounts for 
approximately 70 per cent of all the water withdrawals in the world (FAO, 2008) At 
the same time downstream nations must also be careful in their exploitation because 
they can harm the quality and cycle of the water just as upstream nations can. 
Downstream states can generate harm upstream by effectively foreclosing future 
opportunities for the users upstream. Further on, downstream extraction can generate 
externalities upstream by lessening future available flows upstream because of 
downstream claims of acquired rights to that water (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). A good 
example here is how Egypt, even though it is a downstream country, for many years 
has claimed its right to use two thirds of the water in the Nile (Allan, 1999). Africa is 
a geographical place that clearly illustrates the realities of hydrological 
interdependence. The regional maps drawn by the former European colonial states 
many decades ago has been the reason why every African countries, except the island 
states, has its territory in at least one of the continents 63 (Scheumann and Neubert, 
2006) transboundary basins (Lautze and Giordano, 2006). 
 
 3.1.1. Both national and shared water  
According to modern water rights, the use of water within countries is governed 
through clearly defined laws and institutions (Hodgson, 2006). Burns and Meinzen-
Dick (2000), on the other hand, argue that the common practice to just look at a single 
system to identify water rights is not sufficient. They argue that in relation to this, 
concepts of legal pluralism are central. Instead of just focusing on state law, it is 
important to also recognise that multiple normative and legal frameworks coexist 
(Burns & Meinzen-Dick, 2000). Frameworks like religious, government and 
customary laws, as well as local unwritten norms, may play a part in deciding who 
will receive water for what purpose, and from which source. Especially in rural areas 
of many developing countries, customary or local laws continue to play an important 
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role in water allocation (Hodgson, 2006). In contrast, these elements are rather poorly 
defined at the transboundary level. There are not so many legal or normative 
frameworks to guide riparian’s in how to share their shared water resource.  Thus, the 
sovereignty of states is one of the most important aspects of transboundary water 
management (UNDP, 2006). 
 
Both governments and people tend to think that water, which flows through their 
countries, is something that belongs to them. In some legal and constitutional ways 
this might be true. However, much of this national water is in fact shared with other 
states that might in the same way look that the water as theirs (Jägerskog and Phillips, 
2009). Thus, water priorities might look different depending on from which side of 
the border one are observing. In this way, the management of water claimed by 
several actors requires a well-organized political leadership (UNDP 2006). 
 
Access to water is an essential factor for human development as well as the 
development of nations. Having this thought in mind it is clear that every country has 
its own agenda for using shared water. Naturally, the starting point of any cooperation 
would be to acknowledge that sovereign countries have legitimate, rational as well as 
obvious agendas for deriving as many benefits as possible from the water (Sadoff and 
Grey, 2005). 
 
3.2. International Legal Framework in Transboundary Water 
A legal framework is important at all stages of the design, planning and 
implementation of water management systems. Applying a suitable legal framework 
helps avoid, or settle, conflicts between competing water users and their interests in 
addition to promote efficient management. A legal aspect of water might already be 
challenging on the national scale. When it crosses the national borders and becomes 
international it gets even more complex. When a water resource is transboundary, it is 
necessary to jointly develop a management system and not just follow the rules of 
each individual state (Sadoff et al, 2008). Some of the first international agreements 
focused largely on navigational uses. Agreements made later included regulation of 
the management of water resources for other specified purposes such as irrigation, 
flood control or industrial production. Most recent agreements attempt to apply a 
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holistic approach that includes equity and environmental concerns (Sadoff et al, 
2008). 
 
The following section will focus on the most important laws related to transboundary 
water. Laws that Vollmer et al. (2009) refers to as external drivers for cooperation on 
transboundary water. 
 
3.2.1. The 1966 Helsinki Rules 
Several discussions, statements and resolutions paved the way for the 1966 Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, ten years after the 
International Law Commission (ILC) had started their work on transboundary rivers 
(Salman, 2007b). The Helsinki Rules created the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization of the waters of an international water basin among the riparian states as 
the central norm of international water law (Bogdanović, 2001). 
 
It is noteworthy that the Helsinki Rules on 66 is the first international legal instrument 
to include rules for both non-navigational and navigational uses of international 
rivers. These rules do not include a separate reference to the obligation not to cause 
harm. Rather, they specify the injury that may result from the use of the river by one 
riparian as one of the factors for determining reasonable exploitation (Salman, 
2007b). 
 
The Helsinki Rules have no legal standing or formal binding effect per se. Still, until 
the adoption of the UN Convention 30 years later, Helsinki Rules remained the single 
most widely quoted and authoritative set of rules for regulating the protection and use 
of international watercourses (Bogdanović, 2001). Thus, the Helsinki Rules are the 
first general codification of the law of international watercourses, and they have been 
referred to or adopted by a number of organizations and countries (Salman, 2007b) 
 
3.2.2 The UN-convention of 1997 
The United Nation General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1997. The 
convention builds on the 1966 Helsinki rules for use of shared water and it took the 
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International Law Commission (ILC) about twenty-three years to prepare it before the 
approval (Salman, 2007a). The convention is a worldwide agreement that emphasis 
on the management of international watercourses for other purposes  than navigation 
and their conservation (Sadoff et al, 2008). The core meaning of the UN 1997 
convention is prior notification of works, no significant harm and equitable and 
reasonable utilization (Vollmer et al, 2009). The main idea behind the convention is 
that states should take into account the effects of water-use; size of the population 
affected and socioeconomic needs in other countries before creating a transboundary 
water policy. Factors such as protection, conservation and development are also very 
valuable (McCaffrey, 2008). As of today only thirty states that have ratified the 1997 
UN convention, five short to make it enter into force (UN Treaty Collection, 2013). 
Consequently, since the treaty has not entered into force, it is not yet binding to any 
country (Sadoff et al, 2008). 
 
3.2.3. The 1992 UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention (ECPUTW)  
The 1992 Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes is another important 
framework, in addition to the UN-convention of 1997 and the Helsinki Rules of 1966 
(UNDP, 2006). It differs from the 1997 UN Convention in its consideration of river 
basins being  ecological units, and its focus on the quality of the water within this 
basin. It also obliges the Parties to reduce and prevent water pollution from any 
sources (Timmerman and Langaas, 2004). This convention puts emphasis on the 
responsibility held by states in respect to current water needs rather than historical use 
of water. This last factor is necessary in consideration to the human development 
principle. The convention includes mechanisms for monitoring, information sharing, 
warning and alarm systems, research and development and so on (Timmerman and 
Langaas, 2004). 
 
The ECPUTW was initially negotiated as a regional instrument. It was amended in 
2003, to allow accession by all the United Nations Member States. The Convention 
turned into a global legal framework for transboundary water cooperation when the 
amendments entered into force on February the 6th 2013. It is predicted that non-ECE 
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countries will have the possibility to join the Convention at of the end of 2013 
(UNECE, 2013). 
 
Looking at the rules from 1966 and the conventions of 1992 and 1997, the real 
challenge is to be able to operationalize them within the frameworks of the real world 
problems of water governance (UNDP, 2006). International law regulating 
transboundary water suffers from the same lack of enforceability as international law 
in general. The lack of enforceability, as well as the lack of normative clarity, can in 
some cases result in the strong states disregarding the restrictions imposed by 
international law. Thus, the more influential states and would then promote their own 
interest inequitable to the detriment of co-riparian states.  (Earle et al 2010). 
 
Salman (2007) argues that nowadays is no, apart from the ECPUTW framework, 
universal treaty in force to regulate the protection and use of transboundary water. 
However, an absence of this kind of universal treaty has neither excluded cooperation 
between sovereign states, nor does it imply that the principles are not broadly 
accepted. Even though for instance the UN Convention of 1997 not yet has been 
ratified, it plays an influential role in the negotiation of transboundary water 
(McCaffrey 2008). The principle of these frameworks enables states to find solutions 
and compromises among their different interests. It gives them guidelines and 
procedures on how they can codify clear rules on how water and the benefits derived 
from development of water resources should be shared (Saddof et al, 2008). 
 
3.3 Conflicts and War over Water  
The topic of water-wars has been given a lot of attention to in the literature. Thus, it is 
important to present some of the main features within this theory. However, as water-
wars topic is not directly related to the main topic of this paper, it will be only briefly 
mentioned. 
 
Water is the only scarce natural resource for which there is no substitute in the world. 
Additionally, it is the resource over which there is poorly developed international law. 
Furthermore, water is a resource for which the need is overwhelming, immediate and 
constant (Wolf, 1998). While most countries have institutional mechanisms for 
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allocating water and resolving conflict within countries, transboundary institutional 
mechanisms are far weaker. A risk of conflict over water is evident due to water stress 
and weak institutions (Anton and Shelton, 2011). The control over water resources 
such as river basins gives great economic opportunities to states. In addition, 
possession of large waters becomes intertwined with culture, society and sometimes 
even with national security of states. A study, done by Wollebæk et. Al. (2000) shows 
a larger risk of militarized dispute and armed conflicts between states with a 
transboundary water resource, than within states where the water is completely 
situated within the boundaries of a state. 
 
Despite this, the discourse on hydro politics has changed over the last decades.  
Earlier discussions highlighted the risks of conflicts as the main consequence of the 
competition over transboundary water resources. Later on, scholars have argued 
against the water wars-thesis and instead focused on the potential for water 
cooperation (Kim and Glaumann, 2012). Wolf (1998) claims that the risk of water 
wars is overestimated. Wolf compares the data for water-based conflicts with the 
treaties found in the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Between 
the years of 1918 and 1994 (Kim and Glaumann, 2012) 145 water-related treaties 
were signed. In the same period, there were only seven minor water related conflicts 
reported (Wolf, 1998). 
 
The focus on water related conflicts might stem from the fact that academic literature 
often has taken examples of case studies from the “hottest” and most conflicting river 
basins. Examples of Jordan, Tigris, Euphrates, Indus and the Nile have been given a 
lot of attention in the literature about transboundary water conflicts. Some researchers 
have tried to generalize and draw lines from these cases to international river basins 
as a whole (Boesen and Ravnborg, 2004). 
 
Even though there have not been fought any wars over water the last centuries, 
disputes over this resource do occur (Wolf, 1998). Thus, it is wrong merely to say that 
there either are or are not conflicts over water in the world. There are neither only 
cases of cooperation, nor merely cases of conflict (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). 
However, what is evident is that there are disputes between states that share water 
resources. However, these disputes seldom develop into greater conflicts, as this 
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would threaten the use of the resource itself. Instead, nations either reach a deadlock 
over the shared water, or manage to some degree choose to cooperate (Earle et al 
2010). The management of shared water can be both a source for peace and reason to 
conflict. In the end, it is the political factor that decides whether shared management 
leads to cooperation or conflict (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). 
 
3.3.1 Conflict or cooperation on shared water 
To measure the level of conflict between nations cooperation on water can be 
extremely difficult. The reason to this might be that water is rarely a sole issue of 
foreign policy of states (Earle et al, 2010). However, if one did look closer into the 
relations between states in respect to shared management of water resources some 
factors would seem to appear. The majority of the conflictive events were connected 
to the creation of new infrastructure and changes in volumes of water flows (UNDP, 
2006). Fortunately, many states realize that acts of violence such as war seldom serve 
as strategically workable or economically viable solutions to disagreements related to 
shared water resources (Wolf, 1998). Still, the matter of shared water resources is 
often a very sensitive issue for many states, and consequently it takes time to 
negotiate a proper solution to the problem. Examples that support this statement can 
be found in the facts that it took 10 years to negotiate the Indus Treaty, 20 years to 
agree on the Nile Basin Initiative and no less than 40 years for creating the Jordan 
agreement (UNDP, 2006). 
 
3.3.2 The role of the basin hegemon in transboundary water management 
Serving as one of the biggest obstacles to successful cooperation on co-management 
of shared resources is the factor of asymmetrical power (Jägerskog and Zeitoun, 
2009). What this means is that one state has waster power than another/the others in 
the sphere of cooperation. The risk is that the weaker or less capable states tend to 
play after the stronger state’s rules. This will in turn leave them with fewer benefits 
than they would have gotten from a balanced power-relation (Jägerskog and Zeitoun, 
2009). 
 
A basin-hegemon is often the state, which through being a great regional power, has 
the ability to press through its own interests at the same time as the interests of the co-
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riparian states are curbed. Military force, coercion-pressure, existing treaties and 
sanctions can demonstrate this kind of pressure (Zeitoun and Warner (2006). 
 
A basin-hegemon can be defined based on two characters. The state is either a bully 
or a leader. In a transboundary basin with a clear basin hegemon, the most stable 
situation when it comes to the relations between the riparian states is when the 
hegemon has negotiated a water-sharing arrangement that is perceived positively by 
all of the riparian’s. The basin hegemon then act as a fair leader. On the other side of 
the scale, we have a dominating basin hegemon that seeks maximum control over the 
water resource through a unilateral approach. In such circumstances, the basin 
hegemon can be looked at as a basin bully (Zeitoun and Warner (2006). 
 
However, there are solutions to problems based on power asymmetry. Equality and 
egalitarian distribution of benefits might be achieved through strategies that influence 
“win-win” solutions. Additionally, strategies that can transform the basin-bully into a 
fair leader are possible to create; all it takes is patience, negotiation and willingness to 
cooperate. Furthermore, enhancing capacity of weaker states and creation of fair 
water-sharing and establishment of objective can be effective ways to challenge the 
asymmetry in power and increase the fairness in transboundary water management 
(Jägerskog and Zeitoun, 2009). 
 
3.4 Cooperation on Transboundary Water 
Even though there have not been any wars entirely over water, it does not necessary 
mean that states cooperate in the management of shared water resources. Neither does 
it mean that co-riparian states share the resource fairly and reasonably among 
themselves (Earle et al, 2010). Building effective cooperation on transboundary 
waters is never an easy task (Jägerskog and Zeitoun, 2009). There is not just one 
single and obvious way of handling it. Neither are there many shortcuts that can be 
taken to such cooperation (Sadoff and Grey, 2005). Additionally, sovereign nations 
will always have national agendas for the development of their transboundary rivers. 
This is something that is perceived to be both legitimate and rational (Sadoff et al, 
2008). This can be explained by the null-sum-game, one state loses what the other 
gains. In other words, one state looses a resource, which the other state gains. This is 
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perceived to be a cost for a state, no matter how small the reduction of sovereignty 
(Jägerskog and Zeitoun, 2009). The meaning of cooperation on transboundary water 
can sometimes be unclear. Jägerskog and Zeitoun (2009) attempt to provide a 
definition on what effective cooperation in an international river basin is: 
 
“Effective cooperation on an international watercourse is any action or 
set of actions by riparian states that lead to enhanced management or 
development of the water- course to their mutual satisfaction” 
 
In a river basin, two different states will often have two different agendas. If, 
however, these agendas bear some similarities, a fundament for cooperating might 
occur. The cooperation might become a rational priority of both states when benefits 
cannot be achieved at a reasonable cost through non-cooperative national agendas. 
(Sadoff et al, 2008). Thus, states sharing transboundary resources often choose to 
cooperate based on the evaluation of whether the cooperation will be beneficial. In 
other words, if the gain is bigger through cooperation than through non-cooperation, 
the primary will be chosen over the latter. 
 
3.4.1 Levels of cooperation  
Building accountable and reliable institutions to manage transboundary waters is a 
vital part of transboundary water management. However, it is certainly not the end 
goal of activities and the actors performing them. Promoting cooperation in 
transboundary water management is more a process- rather than an outcome-oriented 
activity (Kim and Glaumann, 2012). Gerlak (2007) has created three categories for 
the degree of cooperation in transboundary water management. 
 
1. Shallow cooperation: Described by having a loose institutional cooperation. There 
are no formalized bureaucratic mechanisms or official headquarters of cooperation. 
Instead, there may be shifting structures such as coordination teams, joint committees 
technical teams, partnerships and task forces. 
 
2. Intermediate cooperation: Described by a more sophisticated level of bureaucratic 
organization. There are regular meetings, which are held between the parties, in 
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addition to a permanent headquarters or secretariat with independent staff. This 
organization is not financially independent. Intermediate cooperation is often 
dependent on donor funding. 
 
3. Deep cooperation: Described as a high degree of financial independence and 
bureaucratic organization. Such institutional arrangements of deep cooperation are 
formal international organizations. They institutionalize oversight in governance and 
cooperative decision-making (Kim and Glaumann, 2012). 
 
Negotiation is a continuing process, which is influenced, yet not totally determined, 
by changes in rules and laws. Agreements, made through negotiations, are major leaps 
for project developments. However, usually, agreements lead to further negotiation. 
These negotiations are often about how the agreement is to be worked out in detail. 
Additionally, through negotiations it is possible to respond to violations and monitor 
compliance, and whether it is necessary to revise agreements (Burns and Meinzen-
Dick, 2000).  In order to reach deep, stable and long-lasting cooperation, it is 
necessary to create appropriate bureaucratic organizations to ensure stability in the 
management (Kim and Glaumann, 2012). 
 
Research done by Gerlak (2007) showed that in total 180 cooperative institutional 
agreements of varying level of cooperation were found in 124 international river 
basins. This means that only about 40 percent of the world's transboundary river 
basins are managed through some sort of cooperative institutional arrangements 
(Gerlak et al 2009). Additionally, where frameworks for transboundary water 
management do exist they tend to be bilateral rather than multilateral (Wolf and 
Hammer, 2000). 
 
3.4.2 Types of cooperation 
Cooperation within river basins can reduce the unpredictable vulnerabilities and risks 
created by the dependence on a shared water resource (Sadoff and Grey 2005). 
Integrated planning cannot stop at the state’s border when the object of management 
floats across borders. Lake basins and rivers are biological ecosystems that can stretch 
across the territory of several states, and the integrity of any part of these systems is 
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dependent on the integrity of the whole system. Thus, the rational way to administer 
the water is to manage it at the basin level, even when it crosses borders of states 
(UNDP, 2006). 
 
The range of the teamwork between states sharing water resources stretches within 
several disciplines. For example, states cooperate in the allocation of water for 
purposes like hydropower production, irrigation, drinking water and water for the 
industry. Furthermore, states cooperate to prevent and control pollution and build 
joint monitor and warning systems in the river basin. Information sharing and to 
increase public awareness about the water recourse are also some of many other 
important aspects of states cooperation on water (Vollmer et al, 2009). Wolf and 
Hammer (2000) conducted a study where they identified 145 transboundary water 
agreements. The results of the study showed that there were 86 % bilateral 
agreements while the rest, 14 %, were multilateral. Out of the 145 cases, 57 were 
about hydroelectric generation, while 53 cases covered water allocation. For rest of 
the cases, see figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Sectoral Distribution of 145 Transboundary Water Agreements 
   
                                                                             Source; Wolf and Hammer (2000)  
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Initially, transboundary water management involved allocating water shares between 
countries. Once the water was divided between states, each of them then worked with 
optimization of management within their borders, instead of across the shared basin. 
The will and motivation for transboundary cooperation are low when the nations 
focus solely on allocating shares of water. Thus, they miss out on the possibilities and 
benefits a shared water management could have brought them (Sadoff et al, 2008). In 
recent times, negotiators of some rivers have focused on benefits, rather than the 
water resource in itself. Benefit sharing offers a more flexible framework that can 
severely increase the range of cooperative potentials (Sadoff et al, 2008). 
 
3.5 Benefits From Managing Transboundary Water 
The first step in motivating states to cooperate is to recognize the widest feasible 
range of potential benefits, which cooperation could bring. If benefits are perceived to 
be insufficient compared to the cost of cooperation, there will be no incentive for 
cooperation (Sadoff and Grey, 2005). Benefits might be whatever that society 
recognizes as valuable. Examples of such benefits are livelihoods, ecosystem, growth, 
services, biodiversity, natural and national heritage, gender equality, security, ethics, 
aesthetics and international perceptions. Understanding and identifying the range of 
interrelated benefits derived from the cooperative management. Thus, development of 
international rivers is central both to better management of the world’s rivers and to 
relations among the states sharing those rivers (Sadoff et al, 2008). 
 
The benefits from the river often reflect history, economy, culture, hydrology and the 
politics of a nation and a region. Thus, the benefits will be unique to each and every 
state involved in the transboundary water cooperation (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). This 
again means that the benefits will vary among states and among river basins. The sum 
of benefits and costs must be weighed and analyzed by the actors prior to the 
establishment of cooperation. Reasoning behind this is that the cost of establishing 
and maintaining multi-country water basin institutions might not always justify the 
cooperative efforts (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). 
 
Grey and Sadoff (2002) present four different types of benefits one can achieve if 
riparian states cooperates in transboundary river basins. These are benefits to the 
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river, benefits from the river, benefits because of the river and benefits beyond the 
river. These four categories are widely recognised and are sited in several articles and 
books, among others in Jägerskog & Phillips 2009; Vollmer et al 2009; Earle et al 
2010 and Wolf et al, 2010. The following section will look closer at each of the four 
categories. 
 
3.5.1 Benefits to the river 
Transboundary cooperation in water management can have great environmental 
benefits; this of course requires management to be based on values of sustainability. If 
the management is indeed based on environmental and sustainable values, the 
development in cooperation can bring benefits to all river users. 
 
In some occurrences, mainly in poor regions, there is often a sharper emphasis on 
river development for human needs than for management of ecosystem (Sadoff et al, 
2008). Fortunately, most of the modern river basin managements incorporate a 
conscious design process to ensure a “healthy” river system. What this means is that 
the managers preserve the fertility of the river soil, protect watersheds, reduce soil 
transport as well as conserve wetlands. Additionally the responsible actors have to 
maintain groundwater and floodplains recharge areas, protect the aquatic and riverine 
terrestrial bio-diversity. (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). 
 
Even though water resources such as rivers often can rebuild and rinse themselves, 
heavy industrial activity, pollution and overuse of biological resources can seriously 
harm the quality of water, amount of water and the biodiversity within the water. In 
worst cases, this can lead to fatal consequences for human and animal life that is 
dependent on the water resources for survival. Additionally sloppy or absent 
management of rivers can become quite costly if left unattained until it reaches levels 
of major damage. Solutions to such problems have to come through transboundary 
cooperation. 
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3.5.2 Benefits from the river 
If managed in a proper way, water resources such as rivers can bring great benefits to 
all the actors that are hydrologically interdependent. Examples of such goods can be 
more food, more power and more navigational opportunities. All of this can be 
achieved while environmental integrity is sustained. 
 
There are several non-consumptive ways of using water. An example can be 
hydropower generation, navigation and recreation. In many ways, one could say that 
this kind of water use does not harm or reduce the quality or amount of water 
available in the system for other users. It is however important to shed light on the 
fact that when water is collected in large magazines or dams, the risk and probability 
of evaporation is significant. Additionally, large magazines of water can reduce the 
river flow downstream for some periods (Sadoff and Grey 2002). 
 
Perspectives on river basin planners can often be understood through their focus on 
the benefits from the use of water. In fact, the basin planner often tends to focus on 
the benefits and opportunities water can give them rather than the water itself. This 
might in turn be dangerous for the biodiversity, cycle and quality of the water. On the 
other side, this kind of focus can provide greater scope for cooperation and flexibility 
among the parties involved. Additionally, acceptability can widen among the involved 
actors (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). Most importantly, the distribution of these benefits 
must be fair in order for all of the actors to be accepting the cooperation and have a 
willingness to be involved. Sadly, there are nowadays examples of benefits being 
distributed unfairly, in a sense where one state gains far more benefits than the others. 
In this way, cooperation does not pay off equally for all of the parties involved. The 
transboundary parties are seldom indifferent to the gains of one another. Obstacles 
such as envy and relative deprivation can occur. 
 
3.5.3 Benefits because of the river 
Extensive advantages from cooperation in transboundary rivers may occur as cost 
savings because of the river. The control of river flows and basins has long been, and 
to some extent always is in all international rivers, a source of dispute and tension 
Shadoff and Grey, 2002). Furthermore, control of river basins is for many nations an 
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issue of sovereignty, national pride and strategic necessity. This type of tensions, 
often inextricably linked to other tensions, may stretch to the point where they affect 
the geo-political relationships between nations within a basin. Thus, tensions over 
transboundary water management can become hindrances to growth, by constraining 
the regional political economy and diverting resources from economic development 
(Shadoff and Grey, 2002). These costs and tensions will always to some degree be 
present in all river basins. Some basins might experience the tensions as insignificant 
while others might experience enormous challenges due to them (Sadoff et al, 2008). 
 
Transnational cooperation can relieve tensions over shared waters, and provide 
benefits in the form of the savings that can be achieved. Furthermore, the costs of 
non-cooperation or dispute that can be avoided. However, costs and tensions of this 
kind will to some degree always present every river basins. In some basins they may 
be insignificant, while in others they might present massive challenges. (Shadoff and 
Grey, 2002). 
 
3.5.4 Benefits beyond the river 
Cooperation on management of water resources can open doors to other collective 
actions between the involved actors as well as cooperation beyond the river. In other 
words, transboundary hydrological interdependence can lead to international political 
progress for those countries that manage to divide the benefits from the river in a 
satisfying way for all parties. If the cooperation in respect to the river management is 
successful, the involved actors might see it as beneficial to cooperate in other sectors 
as well. In other words, flows other than the river may grow. For the best cases of 
river cooperation, the relation between the cooperating states might improve, and 
basis for cooperative socioeconomic development might occur (Sadoff and Grey, 
2002). 
 
Collaboration with regard water systems can facilitate political processes needed to 
facilitate cooperation in other systems. These are systems both within and beyond the 
river basin and can be flow of labour, infrastructure and market. These socioeconomic 
systems have the possibility to “grow” way beyond the river that started the 
cooperation in the first place. It is however important to understand that everything 
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that “grows” from the initial cooperation is closely intertwined. The benefits of the 
collaboration on international rivers might be in addition to knowing how it can be 
fostered (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). 
 
It should be mentioned that all of the four types of benefits presented above have the 
potential to occur in any shared river basin. There is no hierarchical order between 
them in respect to the magnitude of the possible benefits. How important the different 
benefits are will be a result of costs, physical opportunities, as well as in which way 
the riparian states are cooperating. (Sadoff and Grey, 2005). 
 
3.6 Barriers to Cooperation 
Each river basin and each state are unique by its culture, socioeconomic factors, 
geography, biology and so on. Consequently the potential for cooperation between 
states and for possible benefits this can bring is also unique. There are opportunities 
for development and benefits for all states, basins and transboundary water 
cooperation between states.  It is therefore crucial to identify these benefits. In 
addition, it is also important to identify the potential obstacles that might hinder the 
realization of the benefits (Jägerskog and Zeitoun, 2009). 
 
The literature and discipline used for this thesis says little about the barriers to 
cooperation in transboundary water management. In other disciplines, however, more 
have been written on the subject. Cypher and Dietz (2004) describe the different 
barriers to a country’s economic development. According to them, the challenges for 
a development analyst are to try and map all of the largest barriers, which might occur 
and thus hinder the development of a country. The reason for such importance of 
mapping is that it will lay the groundwork for effective measures that public policies 
can try to remove or reduce (Cypher and Dietz, 2004). Cypher and Dietz differ 
between two main types of barriers; internal and external barriers. 
 
Internal barriers can involve that there is an insufficient infrastructure, income is 
unevenly distributed, the role and level of the financial markets, the development 
stage of the education system and the ideological and religious views. Furthermore, 
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internal barriers also include the degree of democratic processes, the extent of 
corruption and the level of market failures. 
 
External barriers can be a result of transnational or multinational companies control 
over resources, the functions of international financial institutions, international trade, 
states interests and power in international politics and the economic systems and 
policies of other states. All states, including developed nations, face both internal and 
external barriers that can act as obstacles to continued development (Cypher and 
Dietz, 2004). 
 
From what the background research of literature for this thesis has shown, there is 
little written about barriers to cooperation in transboundary waters. The impression 
that little has been written about barriers to transboundary water cooperation are being 
supported by Claassen and Granit (2009). According to them, there has been written a 
lot on transboundary river management, but little on barriers to cooperative 
development. (Claassen and Granit, 2009). Furthermore, Claassen and Granit (2009) 
argue that the Barrier Analysis also can be used for identifying different obstacles for 
development in transboundary river basins. 
 
On a general basis, it is difficult to say whether it is the external or the internal 
barriers that are the biggest obstacle to development. It all depends on the 
circumstances around, as well as the characteristics of, a state and situation. The 
relative impact of external and internal barriers cannot be presumed a priori. 
However, it must be understood and studied in each changing and specific 
circumstance (Cypher and Dietz, 2004). Claassen and Granit (2009) argue that 
barriers, which hinder development in a transboundary river basin, most often are 
external with a few internals now and then. Claassen and Granit also present some 
examples of barriers that can exist in a transboundary river basin. For this examples 
see box 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
	   34	  
Box 1. Examples of barriers to cooperation in transboundary river basins. 
Barriers to cooperation  
in transboundary river basins. 
 
1 A high level of inequality between riparian states (e.g. GDP per capita) 
2 Major differences in political systems (e.g. authoritative vs. democratic) 
3. A strong geopolitical influence in a basin by certain states 
4. Difference in riparian state religious views and ethnic composition 
5. A large difference between riparian states legal systems 
6. Difference in access to investment markets by riparian states 
7. The existence of civil strife in a basin  
8. Different and/or low levels of in-country infrastructure  
9. The absence of regional cooperative frameworks, e.g. Regional Economic Commissions or 
           Transboundary waters institutions.  
10.      A basin that is closed i.e. with limited water resources or water quality constraints. 
11.      Limited in-country capacity to manage water resources and to effectively participate in regional  
           cooperation.  
 
Source: Claassen and Granit, 2009 
 
Riparian nations have a tendency not to address standing barriers for cooperative 
management and development. The reason for this might be  sensitivity of addressing 
distinctions in economic and political power within a river basin. (Claassen and 
Granit, 2009). Nevertheless, it is essential to identify and assess the greatest barriers 
to development in a transboundary region. It is important for riparian states or other 
stakeholders to identify economic, environmental, social or political barriers to be 
able to be able to create effective strategies to avoid those barriers, or at least 
minimize their effect on the cooperation within a basin. The Barrier Analysis is a 
valuable supplement to the normal feasibility study to ensure that the implementation 
of a project is as effective and good as possible (Claassen and Granit, 2009). 
 
3.7 Lessons Learned about Transboundary Water Management 
Elinor Ostrom, author of the book, Governing the Commons, argues that in order to 
foster governance of natural resources, rules need to develop over time. Measures for 
conflict resolution should be available, and duties in maintaining the common 
resource and benefits, from exploitation should be balanced (Ostrom, 1990). It is not 
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possible to use a “one-size-fits-all” approach in transboundary basin management. 
Nor are there any clear guidelines for how the stakeholders such as NGO’s, 
governments, interest groups, water users, communities and private sectors should 
involve themselves and cooperate (Schreiner et al, 2010). 
 
Possibly the most essential part of international water cooperation is that the 
cooperation should not be seen as a goal in itself. On the contrary, the cooperation 
should serve and meet the goals of the actors involved. In other words, the 
cooperation should bring benefits by existing, not being the only benefit by its 
existence. Thus, a cooperation process started at a lower level between two states can 
end up in blooming into intertwined and complex cooperation at an international 
level. For this to be possible, the cooperation needs to be fair in the sense of benefit 
and cost distribution. Cooperation is most effective when there is equality in the 
decision-making, participation and power between all parties involved. Although, not 
likely lack the necessary institutions the optimal approach to the management of 
transboundary water resources would be an integrated use of the resources where all 
of the actors involved gaining equally or fairly from the resources (Jägerskog and 
Zeitoun, 2009). Further, to reach the goals set by a treaty it is vital that the states 
actually fulfil their obligations set by the treaty. It is not enough to merely declare 
rules and principles in an agreement. The agreement must be operationalized through 
an actual implementation of it. The process of operationalization is one of the keys to 
success in cooperative management of transboundary river basins (Shadoff et al 
2008). It is important that states think carefully through the possible gains from 
transboundary cooperation and weigh them up against the possible economic, political 
or environmental downsides that such cooperation can bring (Jägerskog and Zeitoun, 
2009). Hopefully, the benefits of cooperation will outweigh its downsides and thus 
lead the state to go from unilateral to bilateral action. The basket of benefits provided 
by the transboundary collaboration will in most cases serve as a motor for effective 
management of shared resources. 
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Chapter 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Research Strategy  
The purpose of this study is to present and describe the process of development of the 
Kikagaro/Murongo Hydropower Project. Hereunder goes surrounding influences from 
different institutions, international agreements, transnational relations, environmental 
regulations, electricity markets, role of the developer, political and economical 
interests of states, the region and lender. In order to find out how each of the 
mentioned, and several others, instances affect the development of the 
Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project I needed to go in depth and get familiar with 
the technicalities of how each the influences are connected to the project.  
 
Consequently it was most appropriate to use the qualitative research strategy and 
interview people from key institutions and organizations connected to and affecting 
the project when I did my research. Also, as the aim of my study is to understand the 
processes around the Kikagati Hydropower Project, the design that was the most 
relevant for me to use is the Case Study approach. The main ambition of the case 
study is to describe a case, which might be a person, social phenomena, an 
organization, social community or an institution. The researcher is to bring out the 
essentials of the case and describe as well as reconstruct it in the best possible way. 
(Flick, 2009) The case study examines a phenomenon in the phenomenon’s real-
world framework (Yin, 2011). According to Stake (1995), it might be intrinsic in the 
sense that it looks at a distinctive case that is worthy of being studied on its own right, 
and even though it is covering only one particular situation it still allows the making 
of unusual insights warranting its study.  
 
As I chose to look at only one instance the case study design was the most suiting for 
me to use. There are several reasons to why I chose this design for my thesis. Mainly, 
it allowed me to look at the essentials as well as describe and understand the case in 
detail. I wanted to go in debt when trying to understand and explain why the 
processes around the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project are the way they are and 
by this present a real life example of transboundary water management. In other 
	   38	  
words, this thesis aims on being an intensive and detailed analysis of one single case, 
which is the Kikagati/Murongo case.  
 
4.2. Qualitative Method 
I wanted to collect rich data that helped me see the process around the development of 
the Kikagati/Murongo Project through the eyes of the respondent, therefore the 
qualitative strategy and hereunder the interview was the most suitable for this study. 
Qualitative research strategy aims at using words, generating theory, looking at 
individual’s interpretation of the world and how individuals construct the social 
reality around themselves in order to collect and analyze the data. Hence, it has an 
inductive view of the relationship between theory and research; it has a contrasting 
stance to the natural scientific model of research; and it implies that social properties 
are outcomes of interaction between individuals (Bryman 2012). In this manner it is 
arguable that the researcher needs to see through the respondents eyes in order to 
create a theory  
 
When thinking about concepts and theories in regard to the qualitative strategy, the 
first is narrowed down as the researcher is collecting and analyzing the data, while the 
latter is created after collecting and analyzing the data (Bryman 2012). Theory is 
treated as something that comes out of the collection as well as analysis of the data. In 
other words, the researcher allows theoretical ideas to be a product of the data he or 
she has collected and analyzed  
 
Qualitative research strategy often opens for a lot of explanation in regard to the 
research field. There are no encoded formats on the social world. This gives 
qualitative research strategy flexibility and limited structure. In addition to this, a 
great deal of descriptive detail is often provided, something that probably stems from 
the high use of the question “why” in this strategy. Related to this is the tendency the 
qualitative strategy has to observe social life as a set of processes and patterns that 
unfold over time. 
 
For this study, qualitative research strategy was relevant for me to use for several 
reasons. Firstly, I wanted to go in depth and get a broad picture of how the project 
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developed and what has affected the development. I wanted to find out how the 
negotiation between the states of Uganda and Tanzania have been taking place and 
most importantly, how these negotiations are affecting the development of the future 
hydropower plant. Furthermore I wanted to look at the historical background of the 
Project.  In sum, I needed to collect rich and thick data about the development of the 
Kikagati-Murongo Hydropower Project. 
 
4.3. Interview 
Interview can shortly be described as a method of data collection that usually 
facilitates direct communication between two, or a group of, people, the 
interviewee(s) and the interviewer(s). This communication finds place either face to 
face or at a distance through telephone or the Internet. In addition, an interview 
enables the researcher to obtain information, opinions and feelings from the 
respondent using interactive dialogue and questions. In this way the researcher is able 
to collect rich data that makes it possible for her/him to see through the eyes of the 
respondent(s) (Mathews and Ross, 2010). In this study, I have used the semi-
structured style of interview. I have also performed both face-to-face interviews as 
well as online interviews.  
 
4.3.1. Semi-structured interview  
In a semi-structured interview the researcher has a list of questions with specific 
topics that she or he wants to cover during the interview. Being semi-structured, this 
form of interview gives the respondents a great deal of leeway on how to answer. The 
researcher has an interview guide that is followed throughout the interview.  
 
The questions in the semi-structured interview are not necessarily asked in the same 
order as they are placed in on the interview guide. The interviewer might even ask 
additional questions that he or she find suiting to ask in respect to the conversation. 
However, all of the questions on the interview guide will be asked, and in more or 
less the same wording from interviewee to interviewee. The interview process is to a 
high degree flexible, though not as flexible as in the completely unstructured 
interview. The semi-structured interview has a degree of structure, at the same time as 
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it allows for room to pursue topics of particular interest to the interviewees (Bryman, 
2012).  
 
When conducting interviews for my research on the Kikagati/Murongo Project, it was 
important to me to have a clear overview of what I was going to ask my interviewees 
about. At the same time, I did not want to have a too strict structure in fear of missing 
out of interesting information the respondent provides when allowed to talk freely 
about the subject I ask questions on. When interviewing, I allowed the interviewees to 
answer my questions and discuss the topics in their own way, using their own words. 
Further on, I followed a set of topics and questions for each interview. However, I 
found it necessary to introduce topics and questions in different ways and orders for 
each of the interviews I conducted. I also found it necessary to slightly adjust the 
interview guide so that it would fit with the person and organization I was 
interviewing. The reason to why I did so was that I interviewed people working at 
different places that had different relationships to the Kikagati/Murongo Project and 
had different areas of knowledge and experience.  
 
4.3.2. Online interviewing 
I used the semi-structured face-to-face interview only when conducting information in 
Uganda and in Norway. Ideally, I would wish to be able to collect semi-structured 
interviews from respondents in Tanzania as well. However, as my resources for 
research are limited both in respect to time and money, I was able to perform face-to-
face interviews only in Uganda. My supervisor supported this decision. When it came 
to conducting information from the Tanzanian side I decided that the online 
interviewing through e-mail could be a good way to get information.  
 
Online interview through e-mail builds on the use of computers and the Internet for 
communication between people. This tool for interviewing enables the researcher to 
reach his respondent no matter of the distance between them (Mathews and Ross 
2010). In my case, it was able for me to conduct information from respondents in 
Tanzania while being in Norway.  
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On the practical level, online interviewing will be organized differently from face-to-
face interviewing. Semi-structured interviews are normally run in one meeting with 
the interviewee and a set of questions is prepared in advance. In an online interview, 
you could try to do the same by sending a sett of questions to participants and asking 
them to send back the answers. But this comes closer to the situation of sending out a 
questionnaire in a survey than to the situation of a semi-structured interview (Flick, 
2009).  To avoid this, I chose to send each of the online respondents a description of 
my study prior to asking them whether they wanted to answer my questions. To my 
delight, all of them found my project both interesting and important. As my 
respondents complied with answering some questions to benefit the study, I chose to 
send only 3-4 questions to start with. The reason to this was that I did not want my 
respondents to get tired from answering everything at once. This might have caused 
them to only answer briefly on each question in order to finish the interview as fast as 
possible. It should also be mentioned that I informed my respondents that I would 
follow up with some more questions later. After I got answers back from my 
respondents, I followed up with 2-3 additional questions. This process was repeated 
until all my questions were answered.  In this way the data collection became more 
interactive than if I just would have sent all the questions at once.  
 
Even though, as stated, I would have preferred to interview each and every one of my 
respondents face-to-face, there are positive sides to online interviewing as well. Face-
to-face interviewing might be more spontaneous than online communication, but the 
latter allows the participants to reflect on their answers more than the former (Flick, 
2009).   
 
There are, however, some limitations to the online interviewing. Online interviewing 
is a kind of simulation of real world interviewing and spontaneity of verbal exchanges 
is replaced by the reflexivity of written exchanges. Non-verbal or paralinguistic 
elements of communication are difficult to transport and integrate. Finally, the 
application of this approach is limited to people ready and willing to use computer-
mediated communication or this kind of technology and communication or this kind 
of technology and communication in general (Flick, 2009). The last is not a problem 
for my sample since all of my interviewees have jobs where they have to work with 
computer-based tools every day.  A problem that appeared in my case was that some 
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of the respondents where slow to answer. This created delays in the progress with my 
research and writing. Nevertheless, I eventually got replies from all of my 
respondents and I am satisfied with the result and that none of them decided to abort 
their response to me.   
 
4.4. Sampling and Informants 
The issue of sampling is about the decision on which persons the researcher wants to 
interview and from what groups these people come from. Sampling decisions in 
qualitative research are often taken on a substantial level rather than on an abstract 
and formal level. The sample in qualitative research is often based on purposeful 
decisions for a specific case rather than random sampling, such as in quantitative 
research strategy (Flick, 2009). The purposive sampling has to do with the selection 
of units that have direct relevance to the research questions (Bryman, 2012) In my 
case, the sample is selected purposively in respect to the case of my research, the 
Kikagati-Murongo Hydropower Project.  
 
4.4.1. Sampling process 
The Norwegian developer, TrønderEnergi, helped me with establishing contact with 
many of the respondents for this research. This was very convenient, as they have 
been involved in the project for quite some time now, and thus had many contacts to 
provide for the research. I explained what actors I wished to get in touch with, and 
TrønderEnergi came with suggestions of who might be the best to contact in that 
regard. I was provided with many contacts in governmental organizations in both 
Uganda and Tanzania. Additionally, TrønderEnergi were helpful and sent the 
potential respondents a description of my study and a short description of my 
academic background and interests with the study. 
 
TrønderEnergi has been involved in Uganda and Tanzania for several years now, and 
have therefore established stable contact with the actors related to the 
Kikagati/Murongo project. To have them introducing me to these actors was of great 
help for me and my research, especially since my goal was to speak to as many 
respondents as possible within the short timeframe of my stay in Uganda. 
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Additionally, most of my informants are busy people with little time to spare for 
things besides work. Thus, it is assumable that it would have been more difficult for 
me to get interviews with them if TrønderEnergi had not asked on my behalf.    
 
The informants within the Tanzanian authorities, on the other hand, I contacted 
directly and without the help of TrønderEnergi. In addition to contacting informants 
as described above, I used the snowballing sampling technique. This technique is also 
referred to as network sampling. The name of this method is based on an analogy to 
the way a snowball increases in size. It first starts of as a small ball, but increases in 
size as you roll it and it pick up more snow. This method proved to be very useful for 
my research, as it helped me get in touch with interesting respondents involved in the 
Kikagati/Murongo project. As the number of people involved in, and having 
knowledge about, the project is limited, the networking/snowball sampling technique 
helped me to explore the network of actors involved in the project. In other words, I 
used the help of the informants I was already in touch with, to get in touch with new 
informants.  
 
4.4.2. The Informants 
Key informant for this study has been the Senior Director for International Business 
Development in TrønderEnergi, Inge Stølen. A key informant is someone with good 
knowledge on the topic that can help the researcher to get familiar with the study 
environment. However, there is a danger of relying too much on one key informant. 
According to Bryman (2012) the researcher risks to see the world solely through the 
key informants eyes and thus the research might become biased. Therefore, I have 
shown great awareness to the danger of bias during the research process and writing 
of this thesis.  In addition to the key informant in TrønderEnergi, I have interviewed a 
representative of the subsidiary company of TrønderEnergi in Uganda, TronderPower 
Ltd. Furthermore, I was lucky enough to meet, and interview, the representative for 
the initial developer of the project, China Shan Sheng’s Elaine Kiew.  
 
The total number of interviews conducted on the Ugandan side is seven, and five in 
Tanzania. The major difference between the interviewing in Uganda and Tanzania, it 
that I interviewed respondents in Uganda personally, while my Tanzanian 
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interviewees were contacted by e-mail. In addition to the Ugandan and Tanzanian 
authorities, I interviewed representatives from East African Community and the Nile 
Basin Initiative. These interviews were also conducted by e-mail. The interview with 
the general manager for the Norwegian-African Business Association in Oslo was, on 
the other hand, conducted through a face-to -face interview. Thus, in total I have 
conducted 11 face-to-face interviews, and 7 online interviews. Se Appendix A for 
more information on my informants.   
 
4.5. Documents as Sources of Data 
Besides using different forms of interview as sources of data, I also used several types 
of documents. Some of them where provided to me early on, while others I had to 
way a fairly long time to get. This was a factor that slowed down my progress within 
the research. The documents I have used in this study are a Memorandum of 
Understanding to facilitate the development of the project, a Power Sales and Sharing 
Agreement, The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, EAC 
Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management, Feasibility study and 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) for the project, the Bilateral Agreement 
between Uganda and Tanzania and reports from meetings in the Joint Technical 
Committee for the Kikagati/Murongo project.  
 
Within my research, I valued the possibility of using documents for several reasons. 
Using documents as data is more than simply analyzing text. Documents can be 
thought of as standardized pieces of work, in so far as they appear in specific formats 
such as: reports, case, notes, drafts, diaries, statistics, certificates, judgments, letters, 
expert opinions, contracts, drafts or birth/death certificates (Wolff, 2004). If a 
researcher wants to understand the nature of documents, she or he needs to stop 
considering them as static, pre-defined and stable artifacts. The researcher must see 
documents as networks of action, fields and frames (Flick, 2009). Additionally, the 
use of documents containing information about the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower 
Project allowed me to go further than the perspectives of members in the field. The 
protocols, agreements and documents I used are not merely a simple representation of 
facts or reality. They were produced by someone, for some intent and type of use. 
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Documents are much more than just facts written down, they are also means for 
communication (Flick, 2009).  
 
4.6. Reliability and Validity  
As my study of the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project is a qualitative case 
study, some researchers would argue that the questions of reliability and validity are 
not as important as they would be if this were a quantitative survey of a large sample. 
Kvale (1996) on the other hand says that ignoring the impotents of reliability and 
validity could lead to a “subjective relativism where everything can mean anything”. 
In fact, there are concepts surrounding this thematic that apply to qualitative studies. 
These concepts are surrounding the question of trustworthiness of the study. Truth in 
qualitative research can be found through credibility, transferability, dependability 
and conformability of research (Bryman, 2012). 
 
In respect to validity and reliability in this study, it was important that I measured 
what I had intended to. In this case, it was important that I collected data that 
answered my questions about the start and the development of the Kikagati/Murongo 
Project. In this research, I do not intend to generalize the results of my data-collection 
to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, I focused on having a match between my initial 
research question, my observations and my collected data. Just as important is the 
ability of the study to be replicated by other researchers (Bryman 2012 p. 392). 
 
Halloway and Jefferson (2000) argue that interviewers who are using qualitative 
methods too often assume that their participants are painting a picture of the reality 
within a situating, exactly the way it is. This is an assumption with two major 
problems. Firstly, the transparent self-problem, when the researcher is assuming that 
participants know themselves and why they do what they do. Secondly, there is the 
transparent account problem, which has to do with the researcher assuming that 
participants are “willing and able to tell this to a outsider” (Hollway and Jefferson, 
2000).  
 
During the data collection for this research, I have had access to reports and abstracts 
of the Joint Technical Committee, as well as project related documents. In addition to 
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being important sources for information, these documents have given me the 
possibility to ”cross-check” the information I have received from my respondents. 
Based on this cross checking, I have discovered few minor gaps between what some 
of my respondents have said and the official documents. This affected the reliability 
aspect. What I consequently chose to do in those particular cases was to use the 
official documents as the trustworthy and reliable information.  
 
4.7. Ethics  
To hold a high ethical standard is considered to be one of the most important aspects 
in research. Ethics can be viewed as sets of rules by which people and whole societies 
maintain moral standards in their lives. The same goes for the research. In social 
sciences the informants are human beings with feelings, believes and opinions that the 
researcher must treat with care (Mathews and Ross, 2010). Research should be made 
and designed in a way that ensures the integrity and quality of the study, and ensures 
that none of the participants in the research are harmed in any way (Mathews and 
Ross, 2010). Semi-structured interviews are often applied to extract people’s feelings, 
opinions and experiences. These types of interviews are often used as part of research 
design that contains the interviewing of small groups of people who are selected as 
respondents because of their knowledge and expertise. Thus, I had to make sure that 
my respondents were well informed about their rights, and that I had their permission 
to use their responses in my thesis. Additionally, in several of the occasions where I 
used a recording device during the interview, I had to first ask for permission to use 
such a tool. I explained that it would make it easier for me to transcribe the interviews 
and get more essence of details from the interview.  
 
A part of the documents I have had access to, are documents I have received from my 
informants. Documents provided by the developer, TrønderEnergi, such as feasibility 
study and the environmental impact assessment have great economic value. In order 
to get access to them, I have had to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Practically, I do 
not have the permission to publish the whole documents with the overall context 
within them. Nevertheless, I have had the possibility to use part of them to actively 
site from. I have additionally received documents from other informants as well. 
Some of them, I have gotten under the condition of not publishing them as a hole. I 
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have taken these preconditions seriously, as I view ethics as an important part of 
research and do not want to put my respondents in any difficult positions.  
 
4.8. Data Presentation To	   simplify	   the	   analytical	   work,	   all	   of	   the	   interviews	   were	   categorically	   gone	  through.	   The	   classification	   of	   the	   content	   in	   each	   of	   the	   interview	   made	   the	  empirical	   work	   with	   presentation	   of	   data	   easier	   and	   clearer.	   All,	   but	   two,	  interviews	  have	  been	  conducted	  in	  English.	  The	  two	  remaining	  interviews	  were	  done	   in	   Norwegian,	   and	   translated	   into	   English	   by	  me.	   I	   will	   in	   the	   following	  chapters	   present	  my	   empirical	   findings	   and	   analyze	   and	   explain	   them	   as	   I	   go	  along
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Chapter 5. HISTORY OF THE PROJECT, THE 
EAC AND AGREEMENTS 	  
In this and the next chapter I will present and analyze my empirical findings. What I 
present is based on both my interviews and the analysis of documents mentioned in 
chapter four. In this chapter I start by giving a presentation of the key elements in the 
history of the project. Thereafter I describe the role of the East African Community in 
the project. In the end I will present the framework and agreements surrounding the 
project.   
 
5.1. History of the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project  
The history of the new Kikagati Hydropower Project started in 2005 when the 
Chinese company, China Shan Sheng Uganda International Co. Ltd, needed 
electricity to power the tin-mines and smelters they where operating in the area close 
to Kikagati.  China Shan Sheng got to know about the old hydropower station that had 
been situated in the area from locals. This old hydropower station had capacity of 
producing 4MW, and was demolished under Idi Amin’s rule over Uganda, in the war 
between Uganda and Tanzania in 1979.  
 
After discovering the old power station, the Chinese company was quick to apply for 
permit from the Ugandan authorities to do a feasibility study of the site. The outcome 
of the feasibility study showed that there was a possibility to construct a hydropower 
plant with 10MW installed capacity. The power generated was first and foremost 
intended to supply the tin smelters and mine. The excess power, not needed by the 
mining industry, could potentially be sold on the Ugandan market. Due to the Chinese 
developer not needing more than 10MW, the potential of the power plant was not 
optimized.  
 
After the feasibility study was completed, the Chinese developer applied for an 
environmental permit, a water permit and a license to run a 10MW power plant from 
the Ugandan authorities. These permits where given, and it looked as if the 
construction project was ready to be started. However, the Chinese developer did not 
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take into account that this hydropower project is situated on a river that flows across 
the border of Uganda and Tanzania. Having communicated with only Uganda, the 
Chinese developer had not applied for permit to use water, environment or land from 
the Tanzanian government. This was soon going to create major complications for the 
developer and the development of the project.  
 
The only way a foreign entity can be allocated with land for investments purposes in 
Tanzania is if the foreign developer registers the entity with Tanzania Investment 
Centre (TIC). The requirement for being able to register a foreign entity, and thus get 
to develop the entity within Tanzania, is to have minimum threshold of capital in the 
country. According to TIC the foreign investment had to be not less than USD 300 
000 (EAC/JTC, 2010a). There was not of interest for the Chinese developer to register 
the hydropower project in Tanzania. China Shan Sheng also feared double taxation if 
they registered the company in Tanzania 
 
”China Shan Sheng had the perception that since both states are part of the EAC, it 
should be sufficient to ask for permissions from only one of the states. But when time 
went on, the Tanzanian authorities said they are still a sovereign state and the project 
needs to be registered in Tanzania as well. This is something the Chinese developer 
did not see the logic in. They thought it was not practical and not necessary to have 
the project registered in both countries.” - Abu Moki, MEAC.   
 
Moki states that Tanzania pointed to their sovereignty as a state in spite of the 
membership in the EAC. This enlightens the lack of communication between the two 
states that share the river the power plant is to be built on. Uganda gave permission to 
the developer when in reality they should have consulted with Tanzania first. This 
placed the developer in some sort of a mediating position between Uganda and 
Tanzania. China Shan Sheng believed that it was not their role to get the two states to 
agree with one another, as their mission was solely physical and technical 
development of the HPP. However, the developer participated in several meetings 
between the two states and sometimes almost functioned as a mediator between the 
tow states, whose mission was to get the two parts to agree. According to Elaine 
Kiew, this was not an easy task.  
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“There were a number of meetings. At times I experienced them as overwhelming. 
There were a high number of delegates from both Tanzania and Uganda that 
participated in these negotiations and where I as a representative for the developer 
became situated in the middle of the non-agreeing parties. Something that was 
particularly frustrating for me was that every time it seems as if we where getting 
closer to something that looked like an agreement on one meeting, a new problem 
would have been brought up at the next meeting”. - Elaine Kiew, China Shan Sheng.  
 
Even though the developer tried to help the parties to agree, every time it looked like 
an agreement was about to be made the negotiations fell apart as new problems 
emerged in replacement of old ones. This resulted in great pressure being put on the 
developer, who in the first place should not have gotten the role as a mediator.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Project site. Remainings of the old Kikagati Power Station seen from the 
Ugandan side. 
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5.1.1. TrønderEnergi takes over 
Even though China Shan Sheng initially thought it would be enough to apply for a 
permit with only one of the countries, they still conducted and handed in an 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment to the National Environmental 
Management Council (NEMC) in Tanzania. The Impact Assessment got approved in 
Tanzania. Nevertheless, the approval of the Impact Assessment did not mean so much 
for the development of the project since the company was not registered there. Thus, 
China Shan Sheng got no way with the land allocation for the project. In addition 
where there many outstanding issues left.    
 
Eventually, the management of the Chinese company began to run out of patience and 
will to continue with the HPP. Additionally, their lender withdrew from the project, as 
it was taking too long to settle for an agreement. In the beginning of 2009 the Chinese 
developer decided to let the project go and to sell it. The Norwegian Electricity 
Company, TrønderEnergi, and the Norwegian Investment for Development, Norfund 
fund bought the project. 
 
Soon after the Norwegian developer bought the licence to Kikagati, the Ugandan 
authorities and the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) approved the required 
documents. In addition to the licence of the project, TrønderEnergi also took over the 
environmental and water-usage permissions issued by the Ugandan government. 
Towards the end of 2009, the consortium of TrønderEnergi and Norfund had fully 
taken over the project and established the Company, Kikagati Power Company Ltd. 
As TrønderEnergi became the main actor within implementation of the hydropower 
project, the company will further on in this paper be referred to as the developer.  
 
An optimization study of the project site was done not long after TrønderEnergi 
bought the HPP from China Shan Sheng. A joint venture of the consulting companies, 
Scott Wilson and Norplan, were appointed for the job of investigating the capacities 
of the project site.  The result of the study was completed in 2010. The outcomes of 
the optimization study showed that the possible installed capacity of the power plant 
was 16MW instead of 10MW as the initial feasibility study showed (Koksæter, 2011). 
Fallout of the optimization study also recommended a few changes in the design, but 
there were no changes in the design or size of the dam. In addition it was discovered 
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that the topographic survey conducted in the previous feasibility study had slightly 
overestimated the fall in the river. Due to this, in the new study, the reservoir was 
estimated to cover approximately 25 per cent more land than accounted for in the 
initial feasibility report (Koksæter, 2011).  
 
On the background of the new feasibility study done by TrønderEnergi, it became 
acknowledged that the HPP had optimization potential up to 16MW. Now that the 
developer had learned that the capacity of the project was vaster than initially 
assumed, there was need for a new license. Therefore, TrønderEnergi created a 
“Change of Scope Report” which would be given to the Ugandan authorities along 
with application for license.  “The previous developer, China Chan Cheng, thought 
they could transfer their licence to the new developer. Unfortunately this is not the 
way it works. ERA told the new developer that they had to reapply for the license. 
This process took quite a long time.” - James Philip Sembeguya, ERA. As the process 
of acquiring a new license took some time, TrønderEnergi had to be patient  
 
In addition to the “Change of Scope Report”, the developer handed in a revised 
version of the Environmental Impact Asessement (EIA) to the National Environment 
Management Authority (NEMA) in Uganda. A new EIA was also given to the 
Tanzanian Environmental Authorities in 2011.  
 
TrønderEnergi approached the development of the project and the formalities around 
it differently than China Shan Sheng. The Norwegian company acknowledged that in 
order for the project to become realized there was a need for registration in Tanzania. 
Thus, in 2010 TrønderEnergi began the process of registering their company with the 
Tanzanian authorities. This was a process the previous developer saw as unnecessary, 
as both Tanzania and Uganda are members of the EAC.  
 
The major distinction between the approaches of the two developers is that the first 
developer started by treating the HPP as a unilateral project, while the second 
developer approached it as a bilateral project. Thus, a dialogue between the Tanzanian 
authorities and TrønderEnergi began. The plans for the project were presented and 
laid forward before the Tanzanian government officials. This was an important leap 
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forward in the process form being seen as a unilateral project in the beginning to 
becoming a bilateral hydropower project.  
 
In 2010, the new developer participated for the first time in a meeting with the Joint 
Technical Committee (JTC). The JTC was appointed in 2008 by the two countries 
Ministers of Energy and was comprised by high technical officers from both Uganda 
and Tanzania (EAC/JTC, 2010b). Its major role was to facilitate the developer in 
carrying out the investment and addressing outstanding issues. The committee has 
held several meetings to iron out the issues and provided information required as per 
the developer's needs.  
 
The Joint Technical Committee as an institution played an important role in the 
beginning of the HPP. The largest benefit provided by the JTC was that this 
institution created clearness in regard to different tasks that needed to be done and 
most importantly, who should be working on those tasks. Joint technical committee 
helped TrønderEnergi to understand with whom they needed to communicate. At 
times the committee would take the initiative to gather and facilitate meetings so that 
parties that needed to be communicating got to do so. This was especially helpful in 
the initiation phase of the project. However, as the project continued the JTC, from 
the developer’s point of view, gradually lost its importance. At times, Inge Stølen 
says, parties who perhaps had other ideas or wishes for how the project should 
develop used the Joint Technical Committee as a tool to slow down the development 
of the project. Especially, Tanzanian representatives have often caused delay rather 
than progress by participating in the JTC meetings. ”Tanzania has indeed been very 
effective in sabotaging decisions within the Joint Technical Committee. For instance, 
they don’t send the state attorney at the meetings in the JTC, but rather people that do 
not have real decision power. It is only after the meetings have taken place that the 
state attorney set his influence on the reports. This has led to unstable negotiations 
and postponement of cases that need to be gone through.” - Inge Stølen, 
TrønderEnergi.  
 
As the progress of the development in negotiations and planning of the project 
continued, the JTC was used against its purpose for slowing down the progress. 
Nevertheless, the institution still is an essential tool for the development of the 
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Kikagati/Murongo project and it must be regarded this way. The parties should see 
the JTC as an institution that can steer the project in the right direction. At the same 
time it is important that JTC is not misused or sabotaged by one or both of the parties 
for gaining interests other than for the progress of the HPP. 
 
5.1.2. The 2011 Ugandan election 
2011 was an election year in Uganda. According to Inge Stølen in TrønderEnergi, the 
process of election put a hold to the development and decision-making around the 
Kikagati/Murongo project. Many spheres became politicized and few actors dared to 
proceed with the development of the project, as they feared that the government 
would hit down on them. The new parliament was very aggressive in their search for 
and fights with corruption. This led people within administrative positions in Uganda 
draw back so that the government would not suspect them of involving themselves in 
corrupt actions. Those who continued to make decisions risked being called in to the 
parliament to answer for and explain their actions. All of this led to slow progress for 
the HPP on the Ugandan side. Moreover, the CO for the Ugandan regulatory, ERA, 
had to leave his position after making a decision, which fell unpopular with the 
parliament. The new CO who was hired introduced “REFIT”, a new way of 
calculating the purchase agreements between produces and off-taker.  
 
”As the developer, we where frustrated over this new agreement. REFIT gives very 
little economic return to us as the developer. It is almost not profitable for us. It is 
also illustrated by the fact that there have not been drawn any new agreements in 
respect to electric power on a commercial basis after this agreement was 
implemented. We put our trust in that ”GET FIT” will make the project profitable for 
us.”– Inge Stølen, TrønderEnergi.     
A new arrangement of what developers should get paid per KWh produced, ”REFIT”, 
is making things difficult for TrønderEnergi and other power producers as the profits 
will be close to nothing based on this agreement. What TrønderEnergi in the mean 
time is hoping for is that the new arrangement of “GET FIT” will help them survive 
the market in Uganda. ”GET FIT” is a donor-based arrangement that has a goal of 
increasing the energy production in developing countries. The main aspect of “GET 
FIT” is that economic support is given directly to the developer. This leads to the 
	   56	  
possibility of the developer/producer being able to sell inexpensive energy and 
making profit at the same time (Fulton et. al, 2011). A pilot project will be introduced 
in Uganda, where developers of smaller hydroelectric power plants will receive 
economic support from donors. These are project that would not have been possible to 
implement without this kind of support (Deutsche Bank, 2013).  
 
5.1.3. Land acquisition for the project 
The election in Uganda slowed many processes down in respect to the development of 
the project. Nevertheless, in the same period a lot was accomplished on the Tanzanian 
side. In the beginning of 2011 the registration of Kikagati Power Company Ltd. in 
Tanzania was finalized. Simultaneously, the survey for valuation for Tanzanian land 
acquisition was also completed. On the Tanzanian side, land for the project had to be 
acquired from a number of local landowners which had to be properly compensated. 
In Uganda, the Electricity Company, UETCL, was the main landowner. It has also 
been mentioned in several of my interviews with Ugandan Officials that it was easier 
for the developer to get land in Uganda than in Tanzania. 
 
The process of acquiring land in Tanzania has been challenging for TrønderEnergi as 
the ground owners are the local people. To buy “village land” and transforming it to 
“land for development” is a process that needs to be approved in the State House in 
Tanzania. This framework of law is meant to serve as a protection for the local people 
so that large land areas are not acquired against their will. An example of such an 
acquisition could have been if a local chief simply would sell off land even though the 
rest of the village did not approve of this. Consequently, the developers land 
acquisition for the project had to be approved in State House, a process which has 
been time consuming.  
 
The question of land acquisition was not easy in Uganda either, this in spite of land 
belonging to the state owned company, UETCL. The reason behind this was that no 
one in UETCL dared to sell land to TrønderEnergi, fearing that it might look like 
corrupt acts. After a new parliament was elected, a series of investigations and 
interrogations started. A consequence of these interrogation rounds was that 
TrønderEnergi had problems with acquiring land.  “UETCL was clearly afraid of 
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selling government land to a foreign company, especially without any requirements. 
Thus, UETCL presented a number of suggestions that where not acceptable for us. 
We would not have gotten an approval from the lender with those kind of purchase 
suggestions.” - Inge Stølen, TrønderEnergi. The demands from the Ugandan 
authorities put forward in respect to Trønderenerig buying land where too ambitious. 
These demands have caused a lot of back-and-forth in discussions between UETCL 
and TrønderEnergi in regard to land acquisition. 
 
Yet another important part that needed to be decided upon prior to the beginning of 
construction was the border demarcation between Tanzania and Uganda. The current 
border is situated in the centre of the river. As a result of construction of the 
hydropower station, the natural border might be changed. Thus, a more solid 
demarcation of border was required. “The boundary between the two countries had to 
be demarcated to avoid a shift as a result of the disturbance of the water flow”- 
Kasindi Malale, TANESCO.  The process of demarcation was done by hiring of a 
land measurer to pinpoint exactly where the border is situated. By doing this, it is 
possible to know exactly where the divide between Tanzania and Uganda is, even if 
the Kagera River changes its geographical setting.  
 
Despite delays caused by the 2011 election in Uganda, Tanzania and Uganda 
managed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) September 9th 2011. This 
was an important step forward for the progress of the Kikagati/Murongo project. Even 
though the MoU is not a final and legally binding agreement, it still created many 
guidelines for the continuation of the project.  
 
5.1.4. Year 2012 and 2013  
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding was, as stated, a large step in a 
positive direction for the Kikagati/Murongo project. However, there was significant 
need for an agreement that could bind the parties judicially to follow through with 
what they had promised to do for the project. There was need for a bilateral 
agreement. Such an agreement was initiated after the signing of the MoU.  
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In 2012, the parties had come to the final rounds with the making of a bilateral 
agreement. The main attributes of this agreement were going to look into sharing of 
benefits and responsibilities, modalities of power exchange from the project to the 
two Partner States and ownership of the project’s assets after the expiry of the 
contract with the private developer.  
 
Many actors have described the creation-progress of the bilateral agreement as 
challenging. Main reason to this is that it has been difficult to get the parties to meet. 
It has especially been challenging to get people with real decision power to attend the 
meetings.  ”It has also been very hard for the ministers to meet. Very often when they 
have agreed to meet, something else must be prioritised first” – Atama Gabriel, 
Ministry of East African Community Affairs, Uganda. The consequence of meeting 
being put off all the time has been a major delay in the finalization of the bilateral 
agreement, and thus, effective progress for the project.  
 
The constant postponement of meetings between delegates from Uganda and 
Tanzania has led to not only a slow making of the bilateral agreement, but also 
several failures of getting both of the states to sign on the finished agreement. “We 
were supposed to have signed the agreement on a minister meeting on the 16th of 
January 2013, but unfortunately it was called of. Now, I think we will sign it first and 
then send it to Tanzania for them to sign it to. After that signing everything will be in 
order and the construction can begin” - Atama Gabriel, Ministry of East African 
Community Affairs, Uganda. Because of all the delays, the plan of having a signing 
meeting was called off. The plan was changed in to just have it signed as fast as 
possible. However, this way of signing the agreement was also taking quite a long 
time, and without the signature of both parties on the bilateral agreement, the 
implementation of the project cannot begin. 
 
For the developer, 2012 was a year of acquirement of permits such as water permit 
and the environmental permit from both Tanzania and Uganda. Agreements in regard 
to getting permits had been made in advance with both of the states. In this regard, 
Tanzania demanded that TrønderEnergi, in addition to having registered in Tanzania, 
made an environmental impact assessment with focus on the Tanzanian side. In 
January 2012, the impact assessment was approved and an environmental permit was 
	   59	  
issued. The water permit was given to the developer in February 2013. On the 
Ugandan side a new environmental permit was given in June 2012. As for the water 
permit, Ugandan authorities wanted to coordinate this with the Tanzanian authorities. 
Nevertheless, this was not done and the water permit for the Ugandan side were given 
in July 2013.  
 
 
Figure 4. Historic timeline of the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project 
 
 
 
5.2. East African Communities Role in the Kikagati/Murongo Project 
China Shan Sheng was of the believe that since both Tanzania and Uganda are a part 
of the East African Community, it would be sufficient to just register the project in 
one of the countries. They believed that as long as the project was located within the 
sphere of the EAC, everything would be handled as if they were one. However, it 
turned out that it was not as easy as they first assumed. The EAC has not yet reached 
deep integration and the states consider themselves to be fully sovereign. Despite this, 
The East African Community has played an impotent roll in the Kikagti/Murongo 
project. In the following I will give an introduction to the EAC and their roll in the 
project.  
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The East African Community is an intergovernmental organization that was originally 
established in 1967, dissolved in 1977, but then re-established again in 1999. Today, 
the EAC consists of five states. These are the states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Burundi. It is however the former three of the mentioned states who are 
the main signatory powers of the treaty while the latter two states became members 
eight years after the EAC was established. The headquarters of the organization is 
situated in the Tanzanian city, Arusha (EAC, 2013)  
The main vision and mission of the EAC is to contribute to binding the members 
states closer together, and in this way improve the quality of life of the respective 
citizens living within their boundaries. These goals can be achieved through political 
unity, prosperity, shared security, stability as well as political, cultural and social 
integration across borders. Furthermore, the core values of the EAC are stated as; 
Accountability, Unity in Diversity, Transparency, Professionalism and Teamwork 
(EAC, 2013).  
 
As an example of cooperation taking place within the East African Community, one 
could point to the Customs Union established in 2005 as well as the Common Market 
established in 2010. As of today, the further aims of the Community are establishment 
of a Monetary Union and in future an East African Federation. 
 
5.2.1. The Treaty for establishment of the East African Community 
The treaty for the EAC was composed in 1999 and formally ratified in 2000. It is now 
signed by all the five member states. It is determined to strengthen the social, cultural, 
economic, technological and other ties between the involved states (EAC, 2007). 
What is noteworthy in regard to the Kikagati/Murongo hydropower project are the 
Articles 101, 111, 114 and 128, which have to do with energy, natural resources 
management, environmental issues and natural resources, management of 
environment and strengthening of the private sector. These Articles are functioning as 
legal EAC frameworks for the project. See box X.  
 
However, this framework is too wide in order to be able to cause some specific action 
in the Kikagato/Murongo Project. Consequently, the involved parties in the project do 
not get any specific guidelines on what they should do from the treaty.  
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“We have a treaty within the East African Community, but it is too broad. It does not 
give any details. All countries have signed it, but it only says that partner states 
should cooperate in the monitor affairs and infrastructure issues. It does not say 
anything about how they should do so,” – Abu Moki, Ministry of East African 
Affairs. The Articles are presented as they are stated in the amended treaty in the 
tables below.  
 
Box 2. EAC Treaty Articles affecting the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project – 
article 101 and article 111  
Article 101 - Energy 
1. The Partner States shall adopt policies and mechanisms to promote the efficient exploitation, development, joint 
research and utilization of various energy resources available within the region. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, the Partner States shall in particular promote within the 
Community: 
a. The least cost development and transmission of electric power, efficient exploration and exploitation 
of fossil fuels and utilization of new and renewable energy sources; 
b. The joint planning, training and research in, and the exchange of information on the              
exploration, exploitation, development and utilization of available energy resources; 
c. The development of integrated policy on rural electrification; 
d. The development of inter-Partner State electrical grid inter- connections; 
e. The construction of oil and gas pipelines; 
f. All such other measures to supply affordable energy to their people-taking cognizance of the 
protection of the environment as provided for by this Treaty. 
Article 111 – Environmental issues and natural resources 
1.    The Partner States recognize that development activities may have negative impacts on the environment leading 
to the degradation of the environment and depletion of natural resources and that a clean and healthy 
environment is a prerequisite for sustainable development. The Partner States therefore: 
a. Agree to take concerted measures to foster co-operation in the joint and efficient management and 
sustainable utilization of natural resources within the Community; 
b. Undertake, through environmental management strategy, to co- operate and co-ordinate their 
policies and actions for the protection and conservation of the natural resources and environment 
against all forms of degradation and pollution arising from developmental activities; 
c. Shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to each other on natural and 
human activities that may or are likely to have significant trans-boundary environmental impacts and 
shall consult with each other at an early stage; and 
d. Shall develop and promote capacity building programs for sustainable management of natural 
resources. 
(EAC Treaty of Establishment, 2007) 
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Box 3. EAC Treaty Articles affecting the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project – 
article 101 and article 111.  
 
 
 
5.2.2 The EAC Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources management 
The EAC protocol on environment and natural resources is a document that is yet to 
be ratified. Two out of three of the signatory states have signed the protocol, which 
was drafted in 2005. The only state holding back as of today with the signature is 
Tanzania. “The protocol is to this day not ratified. It becomes effective when all the 
countries ratify it. Since it was signed in 2006 before Rwanda and Burundi were in 
EAC, it is only Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania that are supposed to ratify it before it 
becomes binding on all members. However, so far it is only Kenya and Uganda that 
have ratified it. Tanzania is yet to ratify”. - Peter N. Kinuthia, East African 
Community Secretariat. As soon as Tanzania signs the document, it will be ratified 
and put into force. The fact that Tanzania not yet has ratified either this protocol, or 
the bilateral, agreement point in the direction of hesitation and unwillingness to enter 
into binding over-national agreements within the EAC. 
 
The aim of the protocol, when ratified, is to oversee the development activities that 
might have adverse impacts on the environment leading to degradation of natural 
resources and environment. Partner states of the EAC will be determined to fulfill the 
	  
Article 114 – Management of Natural Resources  
1. For purposes of Article 111 of this Treaty, the Partner States agree to take concerted measures to foster co-
operation in the joint and efficient management and the sustainable utilization of natural resources within the 
Community for the mutual benefit of the Partner States. 
Article 128 – Strengthening the Private Sector 
1. The Partner States shall endeavor to adopt programs that would strengthen and promote the role of the private 
sector as an effective force for the development of their respective economies. 
2. For purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, the Partner States undertake to: 
a. Encourage the efficient use of scarce resources and to promote the development of private sector 
organizations, which are engaged in all types of economic activity, such as, the chambers of 
commerce and industry, confederations and associations of industry, agriculture, manufacturers, 
farmers, traders, and service providers and professional groups; 
(EAC Treaty of Establishment, 2007)	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responsibility of making boundless efforts to prevent environmental degradation. 
Furthermore, the states in EAC must enable and uphold sustainable development for 
the good of the present and future generations. This will only be achievable through 
involvement of stakeholders like NGO’s, civil society, private sector and the public in 
environmentally sustainable development of the socioeconomic sphere (EAC, 2005).  
 
In regard of water management the protocol. The protocol also has own an article 
related to water management. In terms of the management of shared water recourses 
paragraph 2 under article 12 on Water Resources Management is of special interest. It 
says as follows; "The Partner States shall utilize water resources, including shared 
water resources, in an equitable and reasonable manner." This is the same as the core 
principle in the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention of 1997.   
 
It is believed that the ratification of the protocol might have optimizing effect on the 
transboundary cooperation between the states involved. This protocol will be another 
guideline which tells how the EAC states should act in different circumstances, and 
transboundary projects such as the Kikagati-Murongo Project, will be able to run 
more smoothly than without such a protocol. “It is important to make sure that the 
entire legal framework is in place…We must make sure to operationalize the protocol 
on environment and natural resources in order to make transboundary cooperation 
more effective” - Waiswa Ayzika Arnold, National Environmental Management 
Authority (NEMA). Thus, optimization of regional cooperation in the area is desired 
by several states. However, there are some states that are more careful with entering 
into an encompassing cooperation. The reason might be that there is fear of losing 
some of the sovereignty.  
 
Waiswa Ayzika Arnold also claims that not being able to use the protocol has been a 
great challenge.“The major challenge the project has faced is that Tanzania has never 
ratified the protocol of natural recourses from East African Community”. - Waiswa 
Ayazika Arnold, National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) 
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5.2.3.  EAC’s role in the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project  
Although the framework for cooperation is too broad in order to be truly effective for 
the Kikagati/Murongo Project, the EAC has been involved in the project in several 
ways. According to the Senior Energy Officer in EAC, Peter N. Kinuthia, the 
Community has contributed to the project through facilitation of meetings of the Joint 
Technical Committee, drafting, legal input and facilitation of signing of the 
Memorandium of Understanding. Additionally, the EAC has reminded the states if 
they delayed their parts of action. Article 101 in the Treaty has made it possible for 
the EAC to interfere if the negotiations have slowed down to a minimum or stopped.  
“This framework enabled EAC to intervene in the project when the two countries 
were unable to proceed at bilateral level” - Peter N. Kinuthia, East African 
Community Secretariat.  
 
East African Community has additionally been involved in the creation of the 
Bilateral Agreement.  All of the communications between the two countries has been 
going trough the East African Community Secretariat. “EAC has been facilitating the 
process. All information sharing goes through the East African Community 
Secretariat, something which has also made the process take longer, but this is what 
we agreed to do” - Atama Gabriel, Ministry of East African Community Affairs.  
 
According to Peter N. Kinuthia in the EAC, one of the biggest challenges for the 
project has been to get the two states involved to cooperate and see the project from 
the same perspective. Additionally it has been challenging to get the states to have the 
same sense of urgency in relation to getting the project going and eventually finished.  
Atama Gabriel points at the way EAC is structured as one of the challenges the 
project has faced. Instead of using the agreements within the Community, it was often 
necessary to use the national laws of the two states. “Because of the way the EAC is 
structured, it has been a very challenging process. The main problem was issues 
related to land, water permit and the content of the EAC treaty in the negotiation. It 
was agreed that land would be handled under national laws, not by the community, 
and the laws related to this are very different”- Atama Gabriel, Ministry of East 
African Community Affairs. Said in other words, not being able to use the framework 
of the EAC in the best way has forced the two states to use their own laws. Something 
which has complicated the process.  
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5.3 The Memorandum of Understanding between Tanzania and 
Uganda for the Development of the Kikagati/Murongo Project  
According to several actors involved in the Kikagati/Murongo HPP, the frameworks 
of the EAC have been too wide to have a direct impact on the relatively slow 
progress, and sometimes standstill, for the project. Thus, when the Memorandum of 
Understanding came to place, an important progress for the decision-making, in 
regard to the project, was made.  
 
A Memorandum of Understanding, also referred to as a MoU, describes bilateral or 
multilateral agreements between states. Nevertheless, even though both of the states 
agree on what is stated within the MoU and sign the document, they are not legally 
bound by it, as it has no juridical role. Still, a MoU is considered as binding, only not 
to a legal level (Businessdictionary, 2013).  
 
The Memorandum of Understanding between Tanzania and Uganda, hereafter 
referred to as the MoU, is an agreement between Uganda and Tanzania on jointly 
facilitating the operations and development of the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower 
Project along their shared border. Thus, the MoU shall govern the joint development 
and operations of the Project within Uganda and Tanzania and on their common 
border. The MoU was signed 9th September 2011 on the sidelines of the 23rd Meeting 
of the EAC Council of Ministers. However, as stated, this is not a legally binding 
document and it is therefore encouraged, in the MoU, that Uganda and Tanzania 
creates a legally binding bilateral agreement on which they can base the development 
and operation of the hydropower project. The document also says that the duration of 
the MoU is until a bilateral agreement is coming to effect.   
 
The MoU document commits Uganda and Tanzania to promote transmission and 
development of electric power and other measures to supply affordable energy to their 
respective citizens while making sure that all activities connected to this process are 
environmentally sound (MoU, 2011). 
 
The objective of the MoU is first and foremost to ensure sustainable use of the water 
to be exploited in the development and eventually operation of the hydropower 
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project. Furthermore, it is important to ensure a nondiscriminatory distribution of the 
benefits that comes from the project. This includes both employments and produced 
electricity. Additionally, the mentioned development of the project must be in thread 
with the objectives of the MoU at the same time as the environmental laws of both of 
the states as well as all relevant regional regulations are respected. Since the flow of 
the river might shift due to construction of the dam, the MoU states that Uganda and 
Tanzania need conduct a border demarcation to define the common boundary for 
where the project will be situated. In addition to this, there must be facilitated 
provision and utilization of the land required for the project as well as provided 
necessary support for expeditious implementation of the project (MoU, 2011). 
 
As for the obligations to be undertaken by Tanzania and Uganda in the light of this 
memorandum, they both have committed themselves to five agreements that are 
identical to both sides. These agreements are: 
1. Facilitate the Study on the environment and social impact assessment. 
2. Co-operate in the demarcation of the common boundary at the Project cite. 
3. Facilitate provision and utilization of the land required for the project. 
4. Facilitate provision of water rights permit to the developer. 
5. Perform any other duties as may be agreed upon by the parties.  
(MoU, 2011, p. 3) 
 
The MoU aims on securing several aspects, which are of urgent character to the 
development of the Kikagati/Murongo project. Firstly, there must be an efficient and 
sustainable project for the mutual benefit of the people of both parties. Secondly, it is 
desirable to minimize the negative environmental and social impact to the 
environment and the project area. Thirdly, there must be an enhanced social and 
economic integration of the parties. This third aspect is covered more broadly in 
article 7 of the MoU. It says that he Parties shall further strengthen their partnership 
within the framework of the East African Community and shall maintain close 
collaboration and regular consultation with regard to the project and other matters of 
common interest (MoU, 2011)   
 
The Memorandum of Understanding also emphasizes at several points that the states 
should be more active in supporting the developer rather than having the developer as 
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the engine of the project. “The main drive force to push the project forward has been 
the developer. The two countries have been working together to facilitate the 
developer. It is also written in the MoU that Tanzania and Uganda should work 
together and support the developer.” - James Banabe, Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development. 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding marked an important leap forward in the 
progress of decision making around the project. Nevertheless, as the MoU is not 
legally binding, there was great need for a bilateral agreement; it is, as mentioned, 
stated in the MoU that such an agreement must be created. Because, only a bilateral 
agreement allows the developer to finalize the project  
 
 
5.4 The Bilateral Agreement between Uganda and Tanzania for the 
Development of the Kikagati/Murongo Project 
A bilateral agreement is a contract between two states that obliges the involved states 
to perform what they had promised in the agreement. The bilateral agreement between 
Tanzania and Uganda on the development of the Kikagati/Murongo Mini-
Hydropower Project is, in contrast to the Memorandum of Understanding, a legally 
binding document, which constitutes what the involved parties have bound 
themselves to. Through this bilateral agreement, it becomes easier for the involved 
states to develop the hydropower project they have agreed to cooperate on 
(Clearpoinlaw, 2013). The bilateral agreement between Uganda and Tanzania is a 
document many people within the hydropower project have been waiting for. 
Although the project started with the Chinese developer in 2005, it was treated as a 
unilateral project that naturally did not seem to need a bilateral agreement with 
another state. After some time with trying and failing the project became the matter of 
two states and naturally, there was need for a binding legal document such as a 
bilateral agreement. Nevertheless, even though TrønderEnergi took over the project in 
2009, the bilateral agreement was not in place until second half 2013.  
 
“The partner states should have had an agreement right from the start of. An 
agreement or a MoU from the beginning of explaining how the land will be accessed, 
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how the power will be shared and so on. This was not the case whit this project 
because most of the things came later on” - Abu Moki, Ministry of East African 
Community Affairs.  
 
Many of the interviewees for this research have proclaimed that there was a lack of 
framework and guidelines from the start of the project. Several of them have said that 
it has been difficult to get started with the project without a legal document that 
provides order in how the development should take place and what the different 
parties where supposed to do. Thus, many say that it would have been a lot easier if 
there were a bilateral agreement, or at least a MoU, in place from the start.   
 
“Things could have been simpler if the framework of development of the project was 
to be developed before implementation, and various tools and instruments 
harmonized and agreed by both the two governments and its organs. Thereafter, 
development of the project could be undertaken as per the agreed framework”. 
Anastas P. Mbawala, EWURA.  
 
When looking back at what could have been done differently, in respect to 
preparations prior to the project, many of the interviewees in this study have said that 
one of the first things they would have done was to get the bilateral agreement in 
place. Additionally, they would have involved Tanzania from the start of the project. 
Furthermore, several of the respondents say that the developer should have been 
involved at the final stage of the project, when all the legal and practical aspects were 
in place.  
 
“First after having a bilateral agreement whit Tanzania, I would advertise the project 
and giving the license to a private developer.  The reason for this is that it first would 
make the development of the actual project go much faster. Second, it would make 
cross-border issues much easier. The governments take care of all the negotiations 
between the countries and the private developer focuses on the project only…. I 
would not have given out any licenses to developers without having secured a 
bilateral agreement whit Tanzania first. The lack of such an agreement has been the 
number one reason for the delay”. - James Philip Sembeguya, Electricity Regulatory 
Authority (ERA). 
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In 2013 the bilateral agreement was finished. This agreement will govern the 
development and implementation of the Kikagati/Murongo 16MW hydropower 
project. With the Bilateral agreement in place, there exists a legally binding 
framework and guidelines for the continuation of the project.  
 
When signed by both parties, the agreement will symbolize and underline that they 
have agreed to take cognizance of the commitment by the members of the EAC under 
article 101 to promote sufficiently prized electric power to the people in the area. 
Environmental friendliness and sustainability are strongly connected to this point. 
Thus, any activity connected with the hydropower project must be of a sustainable 
and environmentally friendly character (Bilateral Agreement, 2013). As for the 
licenses and permits issued by the two states to the developer, the agreement states 
that the parties need to agree on modalities of the subsequent ownership five years 
before they expire.  
 
In regard to registration of the project, the bilateral agreement says that there must be 
a registration of activity in both Uganda and Tanzania. In this way, the agreement 
ensures that the project is treated as a bilateral entity. As states earlier, when 
TrønderEnergi took over in 2009, one of the first actions they did was to register as a 
developer of the project in Tanzania. Now that this practice is stated in the agreement, 
registration of activity in both states is mandatory for the developer. This will also 
apply to any new developer if the present developer decides to withdraw from the 
project.  
 
Further on, the bilateral agreement states that there should be a sufficient flow of 
information between the parties. In practice this will mean that if one of the parties 
wishes to gain some information from the other party, there should not be a practice 
where gaining of such information should be denied by the information holding side. 
This part of the agreement is especially meaningful since miscommunication and 
some times lack of communication at all has led the project to develop rather slowly. 
 
The bilateral agreement also mentions that resolution of disputes between Uganda and 
Tanzania should be resolved rapidly. By signing the agreement, the parties have 
committed themselves to agree that if a dispute should arise between them, the parties 
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should in good faith try to resolve this dispute by no longer than ninety days from the 
breach of the dispute. However, if the dispute is not settled after ninety days the 
parties can take the case to the EAC Court of Justice for mediation. This part means 
that the bilateral agreement has an effective enforcement mechanism, something 
which makes it more than just a symbolic piece of paper.   
 
According to a large number of the involved actors, this agreement should have been 
in place prior to the initiation of the hydropower project. If such an agreement would 
have been in place prior to the beginning of the project, it probably would have taken 
much less time. Largely, the bilateral agreement can be understood as both a 
framework and a set of legally binding guidelines, which Uganda, Tanzania and the 
developer must follow in order to finalize and optimize the Kikagati/Murongo project. 
A large part of the agreement is dedicated to the case of power sales and sharing, 
which will be an important aspect when the power plant is constructed.  
 
 
5.5 The Power Sales and Sharing Agreement  
The Power Sales and Sharing Agreement is the third main contract between Uganda 
and Tanzania, after the Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Agreement, 
which has to do with the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project. This is a practical 
contract that aims at fair distribution of the electrical power that will be generated 
when the power station starts operating. In addition, the Power Sales and Sharing 
Agreement gives guidelines on practical technicalities like how different kind of 
compensation will be handled, how billing will be done, reading of meters, inspection 
of the power station, what happens when the developers license expires and so on.  
Although the last points are important, I will in the following sections focus on how 
Tanzania and Uganda will distribute the generated electricity among themselves. 
 
5.5.1 Lack of power evacuation infrastructure  
As of today, Tanzania lacks enough infrastructures in forms of power lines to be able 
to take up its share of the power produced by the planed Kikagati Power Station. This 
means that there is not enough capacity to take up their 50 per cent of the produced 
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power. There is only the town of Murongo that will able to take up and utilize the 
electricity that will be produced. The area around Murongo has not yet been 
electrified and by today there are no power lines leading to Murongo. “As a part of 
the compensation to the Tanzanian government, TrønderEnergi will set up a 33kV 
power line from the hydropower plant to the town of Murongo.” – Inge Stølen – 
TrønderEnergi. With this power line in place it is estimated that the town of Murongo, 
and the nearby settlements, has capacity to take up 2 MW. This means that 6 MW 
remain untaken and have to be used by the Ugandan side until Tanzania has the 
capacity to take up the electricity and use it.  
  
5.5.2. The electricity market 
Something that has complicated the work on finding a solution to the above listed 
problem and the work with the creation of the Power Sales and Sharing Agreement, is 
the way the power-markets in Uganda and Tanzania are structured. In these nations, 
the electricity market is regulated (Mazer, 2007). Practically, this means that UETCL 
and TANESCO are the only ones buying from the producers and sells to the 
consumers within the national borders. Electricity is considered a physical item that 
cannot be bought and sold freely. This is a contrast to markets such as the 
Scandinavian where electricity is considered an economic entity that can be sold 
freely within the respective market. The electricity market in Scandinavia is 
deregulated, which means that there is a mutual wholesale market, “Nord Pool”, 
where electricity can be bought and sold as on a regular stock market. The purpose of 
a deregulated wholesale market is to run distribution of electricity as efficiently as 
possible. For this market, the main prerequisite is the equal condition and disposition 
for all the users (NVE, 2008). The electricity markets in Tanzania and Uganda 
function differently in regard to the deregulated market in Scandinavia. “…we have 
the reasonability for the single buyers. This means that we buy from the power 
generators and sell to the consumers. We are also the one negotiating the power 
purchase agreements whit the power generators”. - Valentine Katabira - Uganda 
Electricity Transmission Company  
 
As mentioned, Tanzania does neither have infrastructure in the area within which the 
Kikagati Hydropower Station will be situated, nor are they capable of utilizing the 
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whole part of their share of the power produced by the power station. Because 
electricity is a physical entity within a regulated market, it is not possible to transfer 
the rest of Tanzania’s electricity share from another area in Uganda where there might 
be enough transfer capacity between the states. Consequently, the decisions process 
on what to do with the share Tanzania is not able to take up has been challenging.  
 
5.5.3. The fundament of the Power Sales and Sharing Agreement 
The Power Sales and Sharing Agreement builds on the Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) and the Bilateral Agreement. By July 2013, it is still only a draft and the 
contents within it are subjects to negotiation between the involved parties. “In 
addition to the Bilateral Agreement and the PPA there will also be an agreement 
between UETCL and TANESCO, called a Power Sharing and Sells Agreement. When 
the Bilateral Agreement and the Power Purchase Agreement are finished, the Power 
Sales and Share Agreement can be rightfully made. The Power Sales and Sharing 
Agreement must be built on the two mentioned documents…all technicalities are 
going to be defined in this agreement” - Valentine Katabira, UETCL.  
 
The Power Sales and Sharing agreements is a contract between UETCL and 
TANESCO on the rights to purchase and sale the power produced when Kikagati 
Power Station starts operating. The main theme of the contract is that TrønderEnergi 
will sell to UETCL and TANESCO will buy from them. “UETCL is the one buying 
the power from the developer but TANESCO have the right to by 50 percent of it from 
UETCL. This is something that will be stated in the Power Sales and Sharing 
Agreement. The agreement will also say how we will share the power, and say how 
we will be compensated if we are doing some administrative duties like billing”. - 
Valentine Katabira, UETCL. The process of sales and sharing needs to be done fairly 
between the involved parties. Thus, there is a need for an agreement that states 
exactly how the power-sharing process should be done. 
 
Article 7 within the Bilateral Agreement is of special importance to the creation of the 
Power Sales and Sharing Agreement. The contents of this article are listed in the box 
4. 
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 Box 4. Article 7 of the Bilateral Agreement.  
Article 7. Commercial Operations 
 
7.1       The Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (“UETCL”) shall be the lead off-
taker of all the energy produced by the Developer and shall enter into a Power Purchase 
Agreement with the Developer. 
7.2 The Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (“TANESCO”) shall participate in the 
negotiation of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between UETCL and the Developer. UETCL 
shall give TANESCO at least a twenty one (21) day notice of the dates of these negotiations.  The 
Parties and the Developer shall agree upon the venue of the negotiations. 
7.3   The tariff for the purchase of electric energy produced by the Developer shall be as agreed 
upon in the Power Purchase Agreement. 
7.4      The Power Purchase Agreement between the Developer and UETCL shall recognize the 
equal sharing of benefits to be derived from the project and in particular the equal sharing of the 
power to be generated from the project between The Republic of Uganda and The United Republic 
of Tanzania represented in the Power Purchase Agreement by TANESCO as an equal sharing 
partner for the resource. 
(Bilateral Agreement, 2013) 
 
 
5.5.4. Only one Power Purchase Agreement 
As mentioned in the section about the Bilateral Agreement, the developer set a clear 
demand that there would be only one Power Purchase Agreement. If this demand is 
not met, the Developer would not continue the project as the lender who finances the 
project set a claim that there shall not be more than one off-taker. The reason behind 
this demand is that the risk within the project will increase if there were more than 
one off-taker.   
 
The decision of having only one off-taker was not something Tanzanian authorities 
felt comfortable with. “Government of Tanzania was uncomfortable to enter into an 
agreement when the PPA is signed with UETCL and its utility TANESCO is "buying" 
without any involvement in the PPA for its 50% share”. Anastas P. Mbawala, 
EWURA. As a result of the decision to have only one PPA and one off-taker, the 
Tanzanian authorities became somewhat sceptical and uncomfortable to agree to such 
a contract. Another factor that caused difficulties for the negotiation of the PPA is the 
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definition in respect to the size of the power station. The reason to why this has been 
challenging is that Uganda and Tanzania are operating with two different definitions 
of what a small hydropower plant is. “In Uganda anything below 30 MW is a small 
project and therefore tariff is fixed by the Regulator. In Tanzania small projects are 
up to 10MW. In short there are different framework in the two states. Valentine 
Katabira - Uganda Electricity Transmission Company.  
 
Even though Tanzania and TANESCO are not off-takers and do not have a PPA, the 
process of negotiation in the creation of the PPA between UETCL and the developer 
has been open for Tanzania to follow. “TANESCO has participated in negotiating the 
draft of Power Purchase Agreement between the developer and the buyer”. Kasindi 
Malale – TANESCO. This is also something that is stated in the Power Sales and 
Sharing Agreement. It says that Uganda and Tanzania will jointly negotiate the PPA 
with the Developer. Even though UETCL is the main off-taker, and the one that is to 
facilitate the payments to the developer, both parties shall together discharge their 
obligations under the PPA. In reality TANESCO has not been equally involved in the 
negotiation of the PPA as UETCL. Despite TANESCO not being an equal part in the 
negotiation of the PPA, this is an arrangement the parties after a while, at least the 
Ugandan side, considered as a satisfying solution.  “When it comes to the power sales 
and sharing agreement Tanzania is also a part in the deal. Tanzanians weakness is 
that they are not a full part in the negotiation of the PPA. On the other hand this has 
been ok for Tanzania, and TANESCO has functioned as an observer part”. James 
Philip Sembeguya -Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) -  
 
Although the Power Sales and Sharing Agreements is still merely a draft, there are 
many important concepts and guidelines within this document. In practice, the Power 
Sales and Sharing Agreement will govern the sales and sharing of the net electrical 
output that is to be generated by Kikagati Hydropower Station. There will be equal 
sharing of the net electrical output and payment arrangement for the power to be 
delivered to Uganda and Tanzania.  As mentioned, UETCL is the partner holding the 
PPA with the Developer while TANESCO has played the role as an observer. This 
means that UETCL is obligated to take up all of the power produced by the 
Developer. TANESCO will then again buy the part of their share they are able to take 
up from UETCL. TANESCO will be making monthly payments to UETCL for the 
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electricity they are able to take up. Also, the parties agree that they have the same 
priority of supply from the Developer and that neither of them will cause the 
reduction of power-supply to the other party for reasons of meeting other supply 
obligations to its customers (Power Sales and Sharing Agreement, 2013 DRAFT). If, 
however, UETCL is not able to take up all of the power produced by the developer 
and TANESCO has enlarged its capacity to take up energy, TANESCO will have the 
first opportunity to buy the power at the agreed rate from the Developer. 
 
5.5.5. The tariff 
When it comes to the tariff the parties are going to pay for the power purchase, the 
Power Sales and Sharing Agreement states clearly that the charge for the electricity 
received by TANESCO in any month pursuant to this contract, the tariff shall be as 
agreed between the parties and the Developer. Additionally, the tariff shall be 
adjusted annually using US CPI index as provident in the PPA. As for the energy 
charge, it will be paid by TANESCO to UETCL in respect to the number of kWh of 
power delivered to TANESCO during the month as recorded by TANESCO’s billing 
meter in addition to the effective UETCL tariff applicable for that period of time. 
There will additionally be an administrative charge for invoicing TANESCO and for 
doing the routine maintenance on the TANESCO feeder portion within Uganda. The 
amount of this administration charge is subject to agreement between the parties.  
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Chapter 6. THE NBI, PERSPECTIVES AND 
COOPERATION 
 
There are a number of factors and technicalities affecting the Kikagati/Murongo 
project from within. The history and timeline of the project pointed to several aspects 
that have affected its development. Documents and agreements such as the 
Memorandum of Understanding, the Bilateral Agreement and the Power sales and 
Sharing are products of as well as tools for further steering of the project. I will 
continue with presenting some external factors affecting the project, the parties 
perspective on the project and the cooperation between them.   
 
6.1. Role of the Nile Basin Initiative 
The Nile Basin Initiative is a regional intergovernmental partnership between states 
connected to the River Nile. The NBI seeks to develop the Nile in a cooperative way, 
promote regional security and peace in addition to sharing substantial socio-economic 
benefits. The Nile Basin Initiative was officially established in February 1999 (Swain 
2011). Nowadays, the organization consists of ten member states and one observer 
state. These states are Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South 
Sudan, The Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Eritrea is an observer (NBI, 2013a). 
 
The partnership within the Nile Basin Initiative is guided by a shared vision. This 
vision is “to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equable 
utilization of, and benefits from the common Nile Basin Water Source” (NBI, 2013a).  
The common belief is that the member states can achieve greater benefits through 
cooperation and interdependence rather than through competition.  
 
Nile Basin Initiative has developed a set of objectives, which are listed below.  
1. To develop the water resources of the Nile basin in a sustainable and equitable 
way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its peoples. 
2. To ensure efficient water management and optimal use of the resources. 
3. To ensure cooperation and joint action among the riparian countries, seeking 
win-win gains. 
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4. To target poverty eradication and promote economic integration. 
5. To ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action. 
(NBI, 2013a) 
 
The Nile Basin riparian’s has also during the last decade been working on an 
agreement called the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) (Mekonnen, 2010). 
The goal with this agreement is to achieve a permanent institutional and legal 
framework that is based on the vision mentioned above. It has been challenging to 
reach an agreement, as the last year’s negotiations have not led to any successful 
outcomes. This is because Egypt and Sudan have opposed themselves from 
complying to an agreement in fear of loosing their privileges and rights to the water 
they got the rights to during the colony rule of Britain (Swain, 2011). 
 
In spite of disagreements, in may 2010 five states, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda, decided to sign the CFA. The year after Burundi joined in and 
signed it as well. The Democratic Republic of Congo has also showed its support for 
the agreement, but has not signed it yet (Salman, 2013).  
 
6.1.1. The Kikagati/Murongo project in the Nile Basin 
Kagera River is forming a part of the upper Nile Basin. “The Kagera River basin is 
normally subjected to the regulations of the Nile Basin Initiative.” - Jackson 
Twinomujuni, Ministry of Water and Environment. The fact that Kagera is subjected 
to the regulations of Nile Basin makes it mandatory to register it within the NBI. By 
having the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project registered in NBI the member 
states of NBI can evaluate the project. In cases like this, Egyps claims to have a lot to 
say, because of their agreements from the colonial time. The other Nile riparians have 
after thy acquired their interdependence disputed Egypt’s right to have more to say 
than the others when it comes to the Nile. Their main argument is that now that they 
are independent states, they do not oblige the rules from the colonial time. Thus, 
Egypt’s claims are unrightfully seen in the light of the current political circumstances, 
namely that they as sovereign states have not been a part of an agreement that gives 
Egypt a “right to the Nile” (Mekonnen, 2010). Still, Egypt continues to assert their 
right to control large parts of the water through the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. In 
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the fourth paragraph of this agreement following is stated; “Except with the prior 
consent of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation works shall be undertaken nor 
electric generators installed along the Nile and its branches nor on the lakes from 
which they flow if these lakes are situated in Sudan or in countries under British 
administration which could jeopardize the interests of Egypt either by reducing the 
quantity of water flowing into Egypt or appreciably changing the date of its flow or 
causing its level to drop” (Nile Treaty 1929 in Salman, 2013). In principal, this 
agreement gives Egypt veto decision power in all projects upstream in the Nile 
(Tvedt, 2004).  
 
Another agreement that has led to large contradictions between Sudan and Egypt on 
one side and the rest of the Nile riparians on the other is the 1959 Nile Waters 
Agreements. This agreement states that the total annual flow of the Nile should be 84 
km3 measured at Aswan and located 55.5 km3 to Egypt and 18.5 to Sudan (Swain 
2011).  
 
Kikagati/Murongo project has not been subject to any objections from any of the Nile 
riparians. “The project is registered in the NBI, and none of the member states have 
objected against it” - Inge Stølen, TrønderEnergi.  
 
Furthermore, the Kikagati/Murongo project differs from other project by that the NBI 
has not been participating in the development of the project. Usually, Nile Basin 
Initiative is involved in development of projects such as the Kikagati/Murongo HPP 
through NELSAP (Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program). ”NELSAP are 
involved in regional projects as implementing agency for the preparation phase 
(studies), or for the implementation phase,” - Desire Nzayanga, Nile Basin Initiative. 
The reason for NELSAP not being involved in this project is that the East African 
Community already was involved when the Nile Basin Initiative got to know about 
the project. ”Uganda asked NELSAP to help developing the project. NELSAP 
discussed this with EAC in the coordination meeting of the Regional bodies /entities 
involved in the development of the regional projects. We wanted to be involved in the 
Kikagati project, but we stopped the initiative and did not follow up the project when 
we noted that EAC as a sister organization was already involved”. - Desire 
Nzayanga, Nile Basin Initiative. There has not been a need for the NELSAP to go in 
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to the project since the EAC already has been involved and helped it along. “Two 
regional organizations could not be in charge of the same project, it would have been 
duplication of efforts.” - Desire Nzayanga, Nile Basin Initiative.   
 
 
6.2. Upstream and Downstream Relations  
As mentioned, the Kikagati Power Station is situated in the Kagera River, which is a 
part of the Nile Basin. All new projects that use the water in the basin must be 
reported into the Nile Basin Initiative. After new projects are reported into the Nile 
Basin Initiative all of the existing projects are given notice of the new project. For the 
Kikagati/Murongo-project this means that new projects will be given notice about in 
good time before they are initiated.  
 
For new projects upstream, the Governments of Uganda and Tanzania will be warned 
and given the opportunity to object on behalf of the developer if the development of 
the new upstream project will have negative impacts on their production. “We can 
either get compensation from the developer of the new project as a condition for 
environmental permission, as we then become a direct third party downstream, or the 
Government of Uganda can allow us to increase the tariff to economically 
compensate for the lower production” – Inge Stølen, TrønderEnergi. 
 
The fact that Tanzania and Uganda each have a 50 per cent share of the power 
produced by the Hydropower Station is important for the ensuring of having enough 
water flowing in to the power station. “Uganda and Tanzania have each 50 percent 
share in the power generated and will therefore make sure that the power station 
receives enough water. When it comes to the way other countries, for instance 
Rwanda, is utilizing the water it is something that must be agreed on by the EAC.” - 
James Banabe, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development.  
 
When it comes to the conditions downstream, it has been important to make sure that 
no negative effects will follow from the construction of the Kikagati/Murongo HPP 
on the countries located bellow in the stream. There is now known that there will be 
close to no negative effects from the construction of Kikagati/Murongo HPP. “As for 
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the downstream, Kikagati being a run-of river scheme it may not have significant 
effects on the downstream users”. Kamugenyi Luteganya – NEMC. 
 
There does currently exist a plan for one hydropower project upstream from planned 
Kikagati Power Station. The project is called Rusumo Falls and will have 90MW 
installed capacity. Additionally, there will be built a storage reservoir for Rusumo 
Falls Project (World Bank, 2013e).  
 
Rusumo falls will affect the other states the most in it initiation period. When the 
reservoir is filled for the first time the amount of flow downstream will be reduced. 
However, if filling of the reservoir takes place during the rain season and only part of 
the flow is impounded, it may be achievable to fill Rusumo Reservoir without severe 
impact on Kikagati. Though, if all of the flow were to be impounded at Rusumo, only 
the flow from the intermediate catchment, approximately 30 per cent, would reach 
Kikagati Evans, 2009). This would most probably result in reduced generation by 
Kikagati Power Station during the impoundment period of the reservoir. Additionally, 
even if the reservoir could significantly increase evaporation losses, the seasonal 
regulation, provided by the reservoir, is likely to result in a net increase the long-term 
average generation by Kikagati (Evans, 2009).  
 
 
6.3. Environmental Aspects of the Project 
When it comes to environmental aspects of the project there have been done a number 
of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, by both the first and the second 
developer. What all of the assessments have in common is that none of them show a 
risk of environmental and/or social damages as a result of construction of the 
hydropower station (Kagoda et al, 2006; Laugen et al, 2011; Ndyabarema et al, 2011). 
In most of the cases, the impact on environment and social sphere is minimal/none to 
low negative or low positive. In some cases, there has been medium negative and 
medium positive impact on the surrounding areas of where the power station is to be 
situated. These results are harmonising and being reflected by what the respondents of 
interviews done in the study has said.  
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Few people have been worried about environmental and social damages due to the 
development of the project. The following statement from Waiswa Ayazika Arnold in 
NEMA summarizes this point of view: ”From the EIA there are not so much impacts. 
If there are any impacts to the environment, it is impacts that is known to mini 
hydropower.”  
 
 
Figure 5. Project site. Surrounding area seen from the Ugandan side. 
 
 
6.3.1. Predicted impacts 
Even though the impacts by the project are expected to be minor, it is still important 
to mention what effect the development of the power station will have on the 
surrounding areas, seen from an environmental and social perspective.  
 
One of the positive outcomes of the project is expected to be increase in fish 
production as a result of increased invertebrate ranges, creation of employment, and 
general economic empowerment. Additionally, there might be an increased habitat for 
hippos (Ndyabarema et al, 2011).  
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The negative impacts on the biodiversity and the ecology of the river are described as 
minimal or small. One of the most frequently mentioned negative impact is increased 
sedimentation, noise and vibrations during the construction phase.  
Furthermore, a possible increase of malaria might occur as a result of construction of 
a reservoir covering approximately 50 acres (Ndyabarema et al, 2011). This reservoir 
will increase the breeding sites for mosquitoes.  
 
Another negative impact that is given attention to, within literature and governmental 
sphere, is the land area that the project will be taking up ”There have been some 
minor issues on the Tanzanian side of the border. Issues related to compensation for 
land etc.” - Waiswa Ayazika Arnold - NEMA. The infrastructure of the power plant 
and the reservoir will be taking up some land area. On both sides of the river a few 
people are cultivating crops. In addition to this, two households on the Tanzanian side 
will be directly affected by the construction. These households have to be relocated to 
another place when building of the hydropower station will take place. Lands, which 
are privately owned or are established by longtime cultivation, have to be 
compensated (World Bank, 2013f; Laugen et al, 2011). Additionally, to the 
compensation for land and households, established perennial crops had to be surveyed 
and compensated for. The compensation needed to correlate with the currently valid 
local compensation rates (Laugen et al, 2011).     
 
6.4. The Contact Between the Parties   
When focusing on the relation between the Ugandan and Tanzanian side in this 
project, it is important to have in mind that there was no contact between them prior 
to the initiation of the project. During the beginning of the Kikagati/Murongo project, 
in 2005, the project was called The Kikagati Project, and was seen as a unilateral 
hydropower project belonging to Uganda and the Chinese developer. This means that 
Tanzania, who also owns territory and the resources the power station would be based 
on was not included. Based on these circumstances, the contact between the developer 
and the Ugandan side went on as in a regular domestic matter. The communication 
was in this case happening between the developer and the domestic actors within 
Uganda with direct legal, political and socioeconomic meaning to the project. When 
Tanzania became involved in the project, the number of actors the developer had to 
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communicate with doubled. Moreover, when Tanzania became involved in the project 
Uganda had already gained knowledge and information that needed to be shared with 
Tanzania. ”Uganda have been sharing information regarding the project with 
Tanzania.  Relevant institutions and authorities from both parties have been involved 
into bilateral discussions and issuance of requisite certificates and permits for 
environmental issues, water and land uses which are necessarily issued by the 
referred   institutions and authorities from both Tanzania and Uganda.” Samuel I. 
Mgweno, Ministry of Energy and Minerals.  
 
Naturally, communication became the key for enabling of progress with the project. 
There are many actors who have to give licenses and approve plans in order for the 
Kikagati/Murongo project to become realized. Ministry of Energy and Minerales/ 
Mineral Development are the primary responsible actors in energy projects. ERA and 
EWURA are responsible for granting licenses. The Ministries of Water is responsible 
for giving water licenses. NEMA and NEMC are responsible for approving 
environmental impact assessments and granting environmental permission. UETCL 
and TANESCO are the state owned Ugandan and Tanzanian electricity companies 
responsible for sale and purchase of produced power.  All of them have to agree in 
order for the Kikagati/Murongo project to become finalized. Hence, it is clear that a 
unilateral approach to this project is all but the right way to go.  
 
The Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project is the first project of its kind in Africa. 
The project represents the first case where a developer is responsible for the planning 
and construction of a power station situated on a river shared between two states. In 
this context, it was natural that there would be some difficulties and challenging 
situations in the progress of the project. Especially challenging was the lack of 
possibility to use the framework of the East African Community, as it was too wide to 
have a practical effect on the project. Moreover, the contact and communication 
between these states has been varying and at times difficult. Communication flows 
have moved in complex webs between the involved actors. An explanation of how 
this interaction took place, and overview of who did what, is presented below.  
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6.4.1 EAC – the facilitator 
East African Community Secretariat has facilitated the project. At an early stage in 
the project it became decided the EAC was the right institution to have the role as 
facilitator. Practically, this would mean that all of the official contact and information 
exchange between the involved actors would go through the secretary of the EAC in 
Arusha. Nevertheless, this does not imply that all of the communication between the 
involved parties went through the East African Community. The different institutions 
in Uganda and Tanzania, as well as the developer often communicated directly with 
one another. However, all of the official information exchange, especially related to 
decisions, had to go through the EAC. 
 
6.4.2. Ministries of EAC, a liaison between the parties.  
The ministry of East African Cooperation/Commnity Affairs have served as 
connection enablers and contact points in the project.  “Ministry of East African 
Cooperation is involved in the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project as a 
coordinating Ministry for all East African Community issues… According the Treaty 
Establishing East African Community, all communication must be pass through the 
Ministries responsible for EAC Affairs. In this regard, Ministries of EAC (Tanzania 
and Uganda) are the link between two utilities and the Developer” - Abdillah Mataka, 
Ministry of East African Cooperation. Thus, the ministries have had the responsibility 
of collecting and forwarding information and communication between the parties and 
the developer.  
 
One of the major challenges for these ministries has been that they don’t have 
enforcement or influencing power within the decision-making progress. Likewise, the 
large number of cases the EAC Ministries are involved in represents a challenge. 
Health, infrastructure and energy are only some of the cases the ministries are 
involved in. All the decisions are made trough relevant ministries in the respective 
countries. The Ministries of EAC’s role is merely to coordinate with the EAC 
Secretariat and the other EAC Ministries. According to Abu Moki, many of the 
countries involved in the East African Community, and their respective ministries, are 
thinking and acting very nationalistic and protective. Consequently, this results in 
interests of each individual state to triumph over the collective interests in achieving 
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collective goods. Naturally, this leads to no common goals being achieved at all. The 
mentioned tendency is something the Ministries of EAC is trying to change. “We have 
put a lot of effort in implementing the feeling that we are a community. We should say 
we are East African, we should think East African. It is give and take in the spirit of 
East Africanisme” - Abu Moki – Ministry of East African Community Affairs.   
 
According to the developer, the Ministries of EAC in the two countries have been 
helpful when there has been need for faster progress in some situations. However, at 
occasions, the two ministries have been forces for slowing down progress rather than 
speeding it up. “The EAC Ministries has been the liaison used to make thing go 
faster. They have been helpful. However, sometimes the ministries have been used to 
slow the speed of the progress down. For example, if one of the parties does not like 
the direction the project is taking, they simply contact their EAC ministry and ask for 
a new meeting to change the decision they did not like.” – Inge Stølen, TrønderEnergi 
Thus, the parties have occasionally used the ministries, and their role as liaisons, to 
slow down or change the development of the project.  
 
6.4.3. Ministry of Energy and Minerals, the overarching decision maker  
The Ministries of Energy and Minerals in Uganda and Tanzania have been the main 
actors taking decisions and allowing for things to happen and thus, the project to 
develop. These ministries have been the highest representatives on major meeting in 
regard to the project.  Additionally, the ministers have been the main receivers and 
senders of information concerning progress of the Kikagati/Murongo project. “It is 
primarily the Ministry of Energy in the two respective states that have been 
responsible for the contact between the states” – Inge Stølen, TrønderEnergi. 
Additionally, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals in Uganda partially functioned as a 
liaison to Tanzania on behalf of the developer.  “We have been representing the 
government of Uganda in meetings whit Tanzania. We have been the main link to the 
Tanzanian government, especially when the developer has had some problems” - 
James Banabe - Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development   
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6.4.4 ERA and EWURA, the regulators  
 ERA and EWURA are in charge of regulating the whole electricity industry in their 
respective countries. Any issue to do with electricity generation, transition, 
distribution and so on are administrated by them. They are the ones giving licenses to 
projects, and permits to developers. As the project went from being uni- to bilateral, 
the need for communication between the regulators increased.  “This involved 
explaining to them what is going to happened, give them all the information the 
developer had given us and sit in negotiation together whit them”. - James Philip 
Sembeguya , ERA. Thus, EWURA and ERA have been information providers as well 
as regulators. 
  
ERA is the institution giving out licenses. ”Despite the Kikagati project being a 
transboundary project shared between two states, the whole installation and 
everything to do whit generation will be within Uganda. Therefore the developer 
needs to go to ERA to seek for permission trough the licensing process.” - James 
Philip Sembeguya, ERA. In this way, it might seem that Uganda sees itself as the 
main stakeholder as the installation and everything to do with generation will be 
situated within Ugandan borders.  
 
 ”Tanzanian parties including regulators had no clear mandate in the project, as the 
license was to be issued by Ugandan regulator, under the laws of Uganda.” Anastas 
P. Mbawala, EWURA. Although, EWURA accepted that ERA was the institution to 
give the license to the developer. Thus, the project did not get delayed even more than 
it already was. ”EWURA were called into the project discussions when some 
regulatory issues have been handled by ERA including licensing plan. EWURA, for 
the sake of progress agreed to the terms of licensing the Developer, be involved in the 
remaining discussions and review of various applications approvals, jointly or 
separately” - Anastas P. Mbawala, EWURA. 
 
6.4.5. UETCL and TANESCO, negotiating the Power Sales and Sharing 
Agreement. 
As mentioned earlier, UETCL and TANESCO have been the main actors in the 
negotiations and development of the Power Sales and Sharing Agreement. Valentine 
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Katabira describes this agreement as challenging in the beginning. However, the 
further the parties came on the agreement, the easier it was to cooperate and create 
something both of them could agree on. “Initially it was going very slowly. In the 
beginning they were maybe a little a little suspicious, but now we are cooperating 
well. I expect the next projects, like Nzongezi, to go much easier”. Valentine Katabira, 
UETCL. Even though the cooperation is now going better than it initially did, there 
are still difficulties for the progress. The most pressing issue in this regard are tied to 
the fact that the parties meet too seldom. Thus, there are few occasions to discuss the 
contents of the Power Sales and Sharing Agreement. Additionally, meetings that are 
set up in advance have been cancelled as one or both of the parties suddenly has 
something disturbing their work schedule.  
 
6.4.6. The Ministries of Water, giving out the water permits.  
Naturally, for a hydropower project like this, it is impossible to only have permission 
to use only half of the water. Therefore, the Ministries for Water in both of the states 
have been in dialogue on the theme of giving out permissions for use of water to the 
developer. On the time they were going to give permit, they thought it would be 
enough if Uganda gave the water permit for their land and Tanzania for their land. 
But this did not turn out to be the case. “Now it was not just longer a discussion about 
rights for water, but about the right for the water resources and all the benefits 
coming out of water. Therefore it became more complicated than if it was entirely a 
discussion about water.” Jackson Twinomujuni – Ministry of Water and 
Environment. Like Jackson Twinomujuni points out, in addition to the question of 
water rights, there were a number of other aspects within the influence sphere of the 
two Ministries of Water that needed to be negotiated. Consequently, water permits 
could not be given before the other aspects had been negotiated and cleared out.  
 
6.4.6. NEMA and NEMC, dialogue over environmental permits   
NEMA and NEMC are mandated to revive and provide decisions on Environmental 
Impact Assessments. The encounters between them have been described as 
challenging and deficient. Initially NEMA had approved the project without 
consulting Tanzania and NEMC. After a while, the developer realised that they 
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needed to get a permit from Tanzania as well. It was therefore necessary for the two 
utilities to start cooperating.    
 
The two organizations arranged several meetings where many important issues 
concerning progress of the project got discussed. “NEMA and NEMC have discussed 
and agreed on how to issue environmental clearance for the transboundary project; 
the two authorities have also consulted each other before approval of environmental 
reports prepared in accordance with each country's legal requirement”. - Kamugenyi 
Luteganya, NEMC 
 
Tanzania required a new EIA study to be done, even though Uganda had approved the 
EIA and given the licence. “This would have been avoided if Tanzania had ratified 
the Protocol on Natural Resources from the East African Community.” - Waiswa 
Ayazika Arnold, NEMA. If they had ratified it, Waiswa believes that the approval 
from NEMA under the protocol would have been sufficient.  
 
According to Waiswa Ayazika Arnold, the parties have not been able to use the 
Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources, as NEMC has not been willing to go 
by any other rules than the domestic laws of Tanzania. This inability of using the 
Protocol created additional obstacles for the progress of the project. “It has been 
difficulty to work with NEMC. NEMA is willing to go by the provisions by the 
protocol, but NEMC is not willing. They say they must follow their national laws.  
This means that the developer has been wasting a lot of time, duplicating the same 
process on the Tanzanian side.” - Waiswa Ayazika Arnold, NEMA.  
 
However, it should be noted that as the developer decided to upgrade the planned 
potential in terms of power production from 10MW to 16MW, NEMA had to 
revaluate the environmental permit and eventually give the developer a new one. As 
the developer worked out a Change of Scope Study, the project needed to go through 
a new round of consideration with the authorities and eventually get a new clearance. 
This time, however, NEMA used much longer time to grant the permission than they 
used the first time. “The lack of clarity made Tanzania run the process according to 
their national laws instead of giving input on the transboundary solution. Therefore 
Uganda had to restart the process. NEMA expected to be the one giving the license in 
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consultation with NEMC.” - Waiswa Ayazika Arnold, NEMA. Thus, NEMA blames 
the transboundary process and NEMC for it taking much longer time with granting 
the developer an environmental permission. It must be mentioned that NEMC only 
followed the guidelines agreed upon and clarified in advance. Poor communication 
between the parties and bureaucratic problems within NEMA seams to have slowed 
down the process of giving the environmental clearance.  
 
 
Figure 6. Official contact 
 
 
Figure 5 shows how the official contact between the parties has been taking place. 
The institutions of NEMA and NEMC, ERA and EWURA, UETCL and TANESCO, 
and the Ministries of Water have given information through their state’s Ministry of 
Energy or Ministry of EAC. The unofficial contact has on the contrary not been 
following the same pattern as it has gone across organizations and national 
boundaries. 
 
Through the entire process of development of the Kikagati/Murongo hydropower 
station, numerous actors have been involved. All of these actors have had an official 
opinion and direct connection to the decision-making. At times, the number of actors 
involved, and the lack of good communication between them, has served as a major 
obstacle for the development of the project. Thus, it might be reasonable to assume 
that the progress would have gone much faster if there were fewer parties involved.  
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6.5. The Parties Perspective on the Project 
The Kikagati/Murongo Project was, as mentioned above, initiated in Uganda, without 
Tanzania being involved. This despite the river, which plays the key role in the 
project, is being a shared resource of the two states. It can look like the Ugandan 
authorities did not think thoroughly through in advance of initiating the process that 
the resources they based the project on are in fact shared with their neighbor state. 
This was something the first developer, China Shan Sheng, learned the hard way after 
they too did not think it would be necessary to involve Tanzania. The reason to this 
was part the fact that both Tanzania and Uganda are members of the EAC, and that 
the Ugandan authorities told the Chinese developer that everything would be all right. 
“The Ugandan government said that they believed everything would be “ok” in 
concern with Tanzania. I have the impression that ERA and the rest of the institutions 
was not aware of that it would be so difficult as it was.” - Elaine Kiew, China Shan 
Sheng. Kiew believes that ERA and the other institutions in Uganda underestimated 
how difficult it could be to get Tanzania to approve the project. The thought of 
underestimation by the Ugandan authorities, shared by Elaine Kiew, can be supported 
by James Banabe’s explanation for why Uganda did not involve Tanzania from the 
beginning of. “It is a learning process. The power plant was going to be situated in 
Uganda and we didn’t expect much resistance. In the next project on the river, 
Nzongezi, we will involve them from the start hear and their views before we do 
anything more”. James Banabe, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development.  
 
It was thus clear that a shared resource was the key element in a project maneuvered 
by one country and a developer they had an individual agreement with. An 
explanation for this way of thinking in regard to involving Tanzania is that Uganda 
might have overestimated the importance of the majority of the infrastructure being 
facilitated on their territory. Additionally, it was Uganda who was supposed to use the 
generated electricity, thus the authorities might have thought that it was of no concern 
to Tanzania. The general thought seems to have been that Tanzania would not be 
interested in utilizing the recourse in the river, since it on the Tanzanian side is 
located in a very remote area.  
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6.5.1 Different perspectives  
The Ugandan way of handling the project from the start led to Tanzania becoming 
skeptical and drawing back from it. ”The approach also caused some suspicion and 
mistrust at the beginning.” - Peter N. Kinuthia, East African Community Secretariat. 
The practice of not involving Tanzania from the initial phase of the project has had 
several effects. First effect, the Tanzanian side has felt overrun by the Ugandan. This 
has led du the second effect, namely that Tanzania does not see itself as an equal part 
in the project. Third effect was that Tanzanian authorities believed that they would 
not benefit from the project at all. ”The Tanzanians was very sceptical and did not 
think that they would benefit from the project at all.  They had the impression that 
Uganda was going to use their recourse without Tanzania getting any benefits”. - 
James Philip Sembeguya, ERA.  
 
 “The project appears to belong to one country, Uganda, and Tanzania appears to be 
an invitee. The initial processes were dealt with the Uganda authorities. They where 
notwithstanding the fact that water is a shared resource and the structures, dam and 
reservoir, are on both sides.” – Anastas P. Mbawala, EWURA. By not being 
involved from the beginning, Tanzania was not able in having a say in aspects such as 
how the project should be carried out and financed. According to Samuel Mgweno in 
the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, the Tanzanial authorities were unhappy with 
Uganda having agreed on the project with a private developer.  
“Tanzania is of the opinion that a project from shared resource should be 
implemented under Public Ownership and public mode of funding so as the parties 
involved have freedom to decide modalities of power evacuation, ownership and 
management of the generating facility and means of recovering the cost of the project 
without any external influence as for the case it is with the developer in between 
Tanzania and Uganda who has to protect her interests on expense of certainty and 
trust among the parties.” Samuel I. Mgweno - Ministry of Energy and Minerals.  
This has made the timeframe of the project expand even longer, resulting in the third 
party, the developer, being negatively affected. As already mentioned, China Shan 
Sheng had to let the project go with this as one of several reasons. Also 
TrønderEnergi has had many challenges in regard do developing the project because 
of the states finding it difficult to reach agreements.  “One of the effect is that the 
parties have to come to an agreement with too many compromising terms which takes 
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longer to conclude and agree on thus the project implementation is being delayed, 
even worse the project becomes at jeopardy of being thrown away should the parties 
fail to reach such compromise. As it stands, the specific effect is the project is being 
delayed to be implemented and subsequently the cost of the project will significantly 
rise. The current developer might as well loose interest in the project.” Samuel I. 
Mgweno, Ministry of Energy and Minerals. All of this might result in TrønderEnergi 
loosing their patience, and eventually, interest in going further with the project. 
 
According to Samuel Mgweno, the project should have been carried out as a Public 
Ownership, where Uganda and Tanzania stood together in the development of it. This 
practis is the same as Tanzania plans on using in a cooperative hydropower project, 
Rusumo Falls, with Rwanda and Burundi (Baringanire, 2013). In this way, one could 
have avoided demands from developer on manners such as the wish of having only 
one PPA. 
 
In regard to the Kikagati/Murongo project, Tanzania has positioned itself as rather 
skeptical and reticent. The managing director at NABA, Eivind Fjelstad, explains this 
by pointing to Tanzanian history with socialism, where general skepticism towards 
private investors has been common. “The year’s whit socialism may also be an 
influential factor that makes Tanzania more sceptical to private foreign investments” 
- Eivind Fjeldstad, NABA. This factor is most likely playing an important role for the 
Tanzanian authorities. In this way, it is reasonable to assume that Tanzania would 
have wanted the project to be a Public Ownership, which they together with Uganda 
could have developed. Nevertheless, despite their scepticism, Tanzania has engaged 
to support the project and the developer through the Amended Treaty for the 
Establishment of East African Community.  
 
The Ugandan side has perceived that the Tanzanian authorities have been dissatisfied 
with how the project was initiated, carried out and handled.  “Tanzania felt that they 
should have been involved from the start. I have the impression that Tanzania felt 
Uganda had gone to fast whit the new developer, and that we all ready had done so 
much when we come to them and just expected that they should approve everything 
without any objections.” - James Philip Sembeguya, ERA. 
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James Banabe describes this exact same reaction of the Tanzanian authorities. 
According to him, they have been slow and very caution on agreeing on anything 
Uganda has put forward in respect to the project. “Since the project started whiteout 
Tanzania being a part, it was hard to get Tanzania involved. They were saying; how 
could you start without us on board, how could you give the developer a permit when 
we are not involved”- James Banabe, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 
Thus, it is clear that Tanzania would have wanted to be involved from the start. When 
Tanzania first became involved, a lot was already done on the project. What they 
were particularly dissatisfied with the fact that most of the stations infrastructure 
would be situated on the Uganda side.  “They also had an issue whit the location of 
infrastructure. They thought some of it could be spread. They thought that maybe the 
powerhouse across the river on the Tanzanian side, and maybe the intake weir and 
the forbay on the Ugandan side.” - James Philip Sembeguya, ERA.  
 
6.5.2. Incentives and reasons to cooperate 
Despite many obstacles and barriers to overcome in the beginning, the project has 
served as a motivating factor for the bilateral cooperation between Uganda and 
Tanzania. Many of the actors connected to the project have acknowledged that the 
project has led to cooperation, and cooperation is the key to using the shared water 
resources and gain benefits from the river. “The resource is a shared. Without 
cooperation no one country can develop and use the resource. So one of the 
motivation to cooperate is to be able to utilize the resource.” Kasindi Malale, 
TANESCO.  
 
The fact that the hydropower project contributes to the production of electricity and at 
the same time the use of potential in the river has been stated by many of the involved 
actors. To ensure that the local populations, living near the HPP, will get electricity is 
highly important for both Tanzanian and Ugandan authorities. Both of these states 
have a deficit of electricity, while the demand for it is high.  For Uganda, who in 
contrast to Tanzania is able to take up its whole share of the energy produced by the 
project, the factor of electricity has been a very important motivator. “Uganda needs 
power and we have a plan to have a certain amount of power in the system by a 
certain date.” - James Philip Sembeguya - Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA). “I 
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hope the project can happen soon because the demand for power is growing faster 
than the supply.” Valentine Katabira – UETCL.  
 
In addition to more power being fed into the main grids, the area around the Power 
Station will benefit from it. “This Project when implemented will benefit villagers 
near the Project area from Tanzania and Uganda”. - Abdillah Mataka - Ministry of 
East African Cooperation. Thus, the project will lead to an increase in the 
electrification and in the development rate in the area around where the Power Station 
will be built.  “The project will give power and make sure that the local villages near 
by are being electrified.” - James Banabe, Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development. This will especially be important for the areas on the Tanzanian side of 
the border. On the Ugandan side of this area it is fairly more developed. There are all 
ready some infrastructure, and the supply of power there is more credible. The 
Tanzanian side of the border, at the point where the project is located, is described to 
still be really underdeveloped. “Espesialy on the Tanzanian side, where they yet don’t 
have power, they will benefit from the project. Places like Murongo will be electrified, 
and therefore benefit directly from the project.” - Valentine Katabira, UETCL. 
Electrification of the Murongo area has also been one of Tanzania’s main motivation 
factors in the project. “The project is expected to be part of a strategy for 
electrification of parts of the Kagera region which have no access to the national 
main power grid. Therefore Tanzania is motivated through the convenience of access 
to electricity for particular rural areas.” - Samuel I. Mgweno, Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals. The project is also described as the best solution for the electrification 
of the Murongo area. “The project is considered as the best solution for electrification 
of the Murongo town compared to getting supply from the existing network” Anastas 
P. Mbawala, EWURA.  
 
The features of the HPP, which is a rather small by size, is being described as 
something positive “A small local power plant like this will also create a more stable 
power supply to the area.  Even if you get detached from the main grid, you can still 
supply the area with power.” – Valentine Katabira – UETCL. Detachment from the 
main grid is not unusual. Thus, and a local power plant like Kikagati/Murongo will 
make the area less vulnerable to such detachment.  
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Power production is not the only benefit that is produced by the Kikagati/Murongo 
hydropower project. Cooperation, mutual understanding and dependence between 
both authorities and local people of Tanzania Uganda are also outcomes of the 
project.  
”The number one positive thing is that the local communities are cooperating very 
well because they know they have something in common which is to the benefit of 
them.” - Jackson Twinomujuni , Ministry of Water and Environment.  
 
The local people, and their attitudes towards the project, are being described as 
positive and welcoming. According to an Environmental impact assessments 
conducted by NEWPLAN for TrønderEnergi in 2011, the local people living near the 
area of the planned hydropower station became happy over the announcement of the 
project. For the people on the Tanzanian side, the project is being described as the 
only way they can get electricity. On this background, the development of, and 
eventually accessibility to, electricity has been important for the development of the 
project. The Project has therefore been assigned a high intrinsic value (Ndyabarema et 
al, 2011). “The positive thing include good cooperation with the neighbors and also 
utilization of the resource improve the life of the people of the two countries 
especially those living in the vicinity of the project” – Kasindi Malale, TANESCO. 
This cooperation is even described, by the local people, as a factor contributing to 
peacefulness for the area in the years to come.  
It might also play a part in keeping the area peaceful and avoid conflicts.” James 
Banabe, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development.  
 
In addition to what is stated above, the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project has 
contributed to the better understanding for the management of states shared water 
recourses. Many experiences have been gained from the project. Thus, the parties are 
better prepared for solving issues and cooperating over transboundary resources in the 
future.  
 
6.5.3. The partner states involvement in the project  
The level of involvement in the project has varied a lot for Tanzania and Uganda. 
Since Uganda has been the initiative taker in regard to starting the project, it is natural 
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that it has been the most involved and participating state. According to Peter N. 
Kinuthia, Uganda has a greater sense ownership and urgency in the project than 
Tanzania. “Uganda has greater sense of ownership and urgency on the project.  
Uganda has undertaken similar projects of small hydropower.  This is only 
complicated by the location, its trans-boundary nature. Uganda is committed to 
develop as many small hydropower projects as possible under Energy for Rural 
Transformation program through the Rural Electrification Authority”. Peter N. 
Kinuthia, East African Community Secretariat. 
 
It is easier for Uganda than Tanzania to utilize the electricity that will be produced by 
the HPP. Additionally, the project was initiated as a unilateral entity of Uganda, 
leaving Tanzania out in the beginning. This has made the Ugandan authorities more 
tied to the project. In a way, they have a stronger sense of ownership towards it than 
Tanzania does.“Tanzania came into the project because Uganda started it.  They do 
not have the same drive and sense of urgency as Uganda.  Tanzania wants to share 
electricity from the project on a 50-50 basis even though the area is currently not 
connected and demand would be much lower than that.” - Peter N. Kinuthia - East 
African Community Secretariat. 
 
An interesting aspect presented by Kinuthia is the difference in why and how the 
countries are acting within the project. According to him, Uganda is the main 
initiators, the action taker. Tanzania is on the other hand merely responding to 
Uganda’s actions. “Tanzania is more reactive to the issues on the project than 
Uganda.” - Peter N. Kinuthia - East African Community Secretariat.  
 
Samuel I. Mgweno shares much of the opinion Peter N. Kinuthia has. Additionally, he 
says that Tanzania will become more involved in the project when the necessary 
agreements will be in place. Nevertheless, according to Mgweno, Tanzanias 
engagement in the project will most likely not be at the same intensity level as 
Uganda’s. “Uganda have had a more undertaking in terms of preliminary works for 
identification and preparation of the project. However, subject to mutual agreements 
between the parties, Tanzania will get more involved. Though, not necessarily to 
equal or surpass as Uganda’s involvement.” - Samuel I. Mgweno, Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals.  
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Chapter 7. BARRIERS AND BENEFITS  
 
The two previous chapters have presented the empirical background and analysis of 
the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project. In this chapter, parts of the previously 
presented empirics, theory and analysis will be discussed and given a more thorough 
attention and reflection. Firstly, the barriers of the project will be presented. Secondly, 
close attention will be given to the benefits produced by the project. 
 
7.1. Barriers to the Project 
In this section, the barriers to development and progress of the project will be 
presented and discussed. The section will take point of departure in the general 
barriers for cooperation in transboundary basins, presented by Claassen and Granit 
(2009). The section also includes some more case specific barriers, which have 
occurred in the Kikagati/Murongo case. When this is said, it is important to add that 
several of the barriers, which complicated the progress of Kikagati/Murongo project, 
also are evident for other transboundary water management projects.  
 
• Absence of a suitable regional cooperative framework. 
One of the main barriers to the project has been the lack of a suiting regional 
framework that could be used for the implementation of the project. Claassen and 
Granit (2009) argue that absence of this kind of framework, or a Regional Economic 
Commission, makes transboundary water management more difficult as there are no 
clear guidelines and rules to follow for the involved parties. For the case of the 
Kikagati/Murongo project, a framework and relevant institutions were in place. 
However, these frameworks and institutions were due to several reasons not easy to 
use. The hydropower station will have a so-called run-off the river design, which has 
no large reservoir where the water is collected in massive amounts. The reservoir that 
will be constructed will only take hours to fill, and after it is full it will not affect the 
water flows downstream. Consequently, this is the reason to why none of the states in 
the Nile River Basin, like Egypt, have objected to the project and taken it to a higher 
level within the NBI. There is no need in objecting since the project will not affect 
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any of the riparian states negatively. The Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action 
Program, on the other hand, wanted to be involved in the Kikagati/Murongo project 
and in this way contribute to coordination of the project. The NLSAP have been 
involved in overseeing the implementation of other regional bilateral and multilateral 
projects (NBI, 2013b) and wanted to do the same with the Kikagati/Murongo project. 
However, when the NLSAP found out that their sister-organization, East African 
Community, was involved in the project, they reckoned that it was unnecessary for 
them to involve themselves as well.  
 
East African Community has a treaty that involves the utilization of shared natural 
resources. This is, however, too broad and only encourages the neighboring states to 
cooperate. Additionally, the EAC has the protocol on natural resources. In reality, 
however, it has no effect, as it is not ratified. In addition to not being ratified, the 
protocol is somewhat wide in its formulations. Nevertheless, the protocol gives much 
more detailed guidelines than the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community do. Additionally, when the protocol is ratified, it will function as a 
convenient tool and framework for future transboundary water management projects. 
The reason to why it will function as a tool is that even though new projects will have 
to have new project specific agreements, the protocol will be a good help on the way 
to fast development of a project. 
 
• Inexperienced facilitator  
The East African Community Secretariat has, as mentioned, been the facilitator of the 
project and had the responsibility for overseeing its implementation. A problem for 
the organization has been the issue of frameworks, which were not possible to use for 
the project. In this way, one can say that the EAC has been constrained. Furthermore, 
EAC is a rather new and inexperienced organization, and parts of it are still under 
development. The last issue has been brought up by several of the respondents in the 
research for this thesis. Two of my interviewees have a rather synoptic view that 
summarizes a lot of what seems to be difficult with the EAC. “East African 
Community looks good on paper, but does not really work in reality” -Busingye 
Annicent, TronderPower Ltd. The opinion is that the EAC is a good idea in theory, 
but it does not work quite that well in reality. No matter how strong the will is to 
make it work in reality, the EAC struggles to be successful. “There is a strong will to 
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make the EAC successful, but at the moment the EAC looks better on paper than in 
reality” - Eivind Fjeldstad, NABA. Thus, as the organization becomes more mature 
and experienced, it might work better than it currently does. Consequently, this 
inexperience and dysfunctionality of the facilitator has made the Kikagati/Murongo 
project suffer. It would probably have been easier for the project if the EAC was 
deeper integrated and experienced. Additionally, the fact that Tanzania has been 
reluctant to involving itself completely in the organization has not made thing easier.  
 
• Power asymmetry between the states in the project  
Power asymmetry means that one state because of culturally, historically, 
economically, militarily reasons etc, is more powerful than the rest. (Shlomi, 2009). 
The differences in these factors are rather small between Tanzania and Uganda, and 
therefore have no effect on the project. Thus, seen from this perspective, the power 
relations between Uganda and Tanzania are equal.  However, the fact that Uganda 
initiated the project without involving Tanzania has led to a power asymmetry in the 
sense of involvement, feeling of ownership and control over the project. In the 
beginning, Uganda, along with the developer, had the possibility to steer the project in 
any direction they wanted. Also after Tanzania joined, Uganda treated the project as if 
it was solely theirs. The Ugandan authorities made the Tanzanian part feel that they 
had merely been invited in on the project, not as if they were an equal part to it. This 
again created dissatisfaction among Tanzanian authorities and lead to a strained 
environment for negotiation in the beginning.  
 
The treatment of the project as unilateral is something that contravenes to what is 
agreed on in the Amended Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC. For as paragraph 
1 in article 111 on Environmental Issues and Natural Resources says “The Partner 
States; Shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to each 
other on natural and human activities that may or are likely to have significant trans-
boundary environmental impacts and shall consult with each other at an early stage”. 
Furthermore, paragraph 1 in article 114 on Management of Natural Resources states 
that the partner states within the EAC should cooperate in the utilization of their 
natural resources. “For purposes of Article 111 of this Treaty, the Partner States 
agree to take concerted measures to foster co-operation in the joint and efficient 
management and the sustainable utilization of natural resources within the 
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Community for the mutual benefit of the Partner States”. Thus, even though Uganda 
has signed this agreement, the authorities in Uganda have omitted to follow it.  
 
It still seems as if Uganda is the party that has the largest sense of ownership and 
commitment to the project. This can be illustrated by even the common name of the 
project. The official name of the project is the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower 
Project. By using the whole official name, which is the names of a Ugandan and a 
Tanzanian city, the project sounds more like a bilateral venture. An interesting fact 
that can be added here is that when collecting research material on the Ugandan side, 
all of the respondents called the project Kikagati. None of them used 
Kikagati/Murongo. This can partly be explained by the detail that the power station 
will have the name Kikagati. Nevertheless, the use of the Kikagati when talking about 
the whole project, and not just the power station, gives the impression that Uganda 
sees itself more as an owner of it. This is something the Tanzanian side does not 
appreciate.   
 
The fact that there will be only one PPA, which will exist between Uganda and the 
developer, is an additional factor that undermines Tanzania as an equal party in the 
project. Moreover, as Tanzania is not able to take up and use its entire share of the 
energy produced by the station, makes the share of the benefits appear as unequal.   
Despite the above mentioned, the balance of power in the project has become more 
equalized.  Uganda depends on Tanzania’s approval and signature on negotiated 
agreements.  However, as the Tanzanian side has to build a power line before they can 
take up their entire share of the energy, they are not in a hurry to get the project 
finalized. Uganda, on the other hand, has the capacity to take up its whole, in addition 
to Tanzania’s, share thus they are more in a hurry to get it finished as soon as 
possible.  
 
• Differences in the riparian states legal framework  
When it became clear that it was not possible to use the framework provided by the 
EAC, the solution became to use each of the two involved states national legal 
framework. This practice made it more difficult for the developer, as all of the 
licenses and permissions had to be applied for twice. The respondents described this 
as a very demanding and challenging process, both for them and especially for the 
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developer. Especially the Ugandan respondents have argued that at least in the cases 
surrounding environmental questions should have gone by the Protocol on Natural 
Resources. The Tanzanian authorities, on the other hand, have said that they were not 
interested in using the Protocol and they would rather go by their own domestic rules. 
Even though this has caused the project to take extra long time, the Tanzanian 
authorities had the complete right to act that way, as the protocol was not ratified and 
thus not endorsed.  
 
The use of two different legal frameworks has not only made the process take longer, 
it also complicated the question of land allocation of the project. The reason to this is 
that the laws on this issue differ in Uganda and Tanzania. This particular issue was 
mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding, where it says that the partner states 
should assist the developer in getting land for the project.  
 
• Extensive bureaucracy 
From a political hold, the project has been cleared and had full support for a long 
time. An abstract of the 5th Joint Technical Committee meeting on the Development 
of the Kikagati/Murongo Project describes two field visits, and meetings, during 
2008. On both of these meetings, officials from both technical and political 
departments of Tanzania and Uganda were present. On both of the meetings, the 
project was supported by each of the parties. The Tanzanian Minister of Energy and 
Minerals and the Ugandan Minister of Energy and Mineral Development led the 
meeting on 31st of August 2008. They pronounced that the Political Leadership from 
both countries had given their clearance been encouraging the project. It was now, the 
Ministers said, up to the technocrats to finalize the project (EAC/JTC, 2009).  
 
It is on the bureaucratic and technical side the project has taken long time. This was 
described by one of the research respondents. “The good wills from all parties are 
there. The only problem is that there are to many involved on different levels, 
something that makes the process time consuming.”  - Jackson Twinomujuni, 
Directorate of Water.  Many people with different opinions have had to interact and 
try to come to common conclusions. The fact that this is the first hydropower project 
that Uganda and Tanzania are working together on has naturally mad it more time 
consuming. Additionally, the bureaucracy in East Africa is known for being 
	   104	  
comprehensive. “The bureaucracy in East Africa can be a great challenge for foreign 
companies that are investing in one or more of the countries in the region.  It may be 
very slow and frustrating” - Eivind Fjeldstad, NABA. This is something the 
developer is aware of and familiar with. In advance of the Kikagati/Murongo project, 
Trønderenergi had performed another hydropower construction, Bugoye, further north 
in Uganda, in the area of Kasese. The development of this project, from initiation of 
planning to start of construction, took merely two years. Consequently, as the 
developer had made good experience from the Bugoye project, they expected the 
Kikagati/Murongo project to be similar on the complexity scale. “With good 
experiences you expect it for the next project as well”. Busingye Annicent, 
TronderPower Ltd. Ministry of Energy and Minerals Development in Uganda has 
additionally stated that it was expected for a project such as Kikagati/Murongo to go 
faster than it has. “I would say that the expected preparation time for a project like 
this is around three years. This because one need to get water permits etc. from two 
countries”. – James Banabe, Ministry of Energy and Minerals Development. 
Simultaneously Annicent admits that the developers expectations were probably too 
high, based on the previous project in Bugoye. “The expectations might have been 
high and it was probably also unrealistic to believe it would go much faster than it 
has. The bureaucracy is slow and government employees are taking their time”- 
Busingye Annicent, TronderPower Ltd. There is however still reason to believe that 
projects like Kikagati/Murongo will go faster in the future. Several of the respondents 
have supported this thought. The reason to this optimistic view for future projects is 
that many experiences have been learned from this project. Thus, it is expected that 
future projects of this type, and especially collaboration projects between Uganda and 
Tanzania will go faster than this project has. 
 
Several of the barriers described above can probably be perceived as small and easily 
resolvable when compared to the barriers that have been present in the work with the 
Nile Basin Initiative or water negotiation in Euphrates and Tigris (see Dauody 2009; 
Tvedt 2010). It is nevertheless important to say that even though many of the barriers 
to the Kikagati/Murongo have seemed small in comparison to other project, they still 
have had a major effect on the progress of the project. Some of these effects and 
barriers could most likely have been avoided if there had been done an analysis of 
them in the beginning of the project 
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7.2. Benefits from the Project  
Sadoff and Grey (2002) present four categories to analyze benefits from cooperation 
in transboundary river management. These categories are best suited for mapping 
possible benefits in cases where the parties have a fully integrated basin approach. 
The agreements and cooperation on the Kikagati/Murongo project are merely a 
bilateral cooperation between Uganda and Tanzania. Still, the framework of four 
categories of benefits gives useful guidelines for mapping benefits for this project as 
well. Thus, this section will now look at the Kikagati/Murongo project in the light of 
the four categories presented by Sadoff and Grey (2002). As some of the categories 
have been thoroughly presented earlier, the following discussion will only touch upon 
them briefly.  
 
7.2.1. Benefits to the river 
 
• Increased focus on the river 
The project is primarily concerning the construction of a 16 MW hydropower station. 
Thus, all of the agreements and negotiations are mainly focused on reaching this exact 
goal.  The Bilateral Agreement only says that the parties should base the development 
on article 101 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. 
This article says that the parties should develop the lest cost energy at the same time 
as they are protecting the environment 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding, which was created earlier in the project, says 
that the development and progress of the project should be done in a way that has the 
least damaging effects on the environment around the power station. However, none 
of these agreements says anything about the environmental aspect in the Kagera River 
as a whole. The respondents never brought up this aspect during the interviews for the 
research. However, this is of no surprise, as the main goal with the project is to 
construct a hydropower station.  
 
The geographical area the project will be situated on is thus limited. At the same time, 
there is reason to believe that projects such as this one will serve as examples to show 
that there is a need for agreements that regulate common natural resources. An 
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increased focus on this theme will most likely contribute to a faster ratification of the 
EAC protocol on Natural Resources. The Protocol has focus on using natural 
resources in a way that does not lead to environmental degradation. (EAC Protocol on 
Natural Resources, 2005). Additionally, a cooperative framework is created, under the 
influence of NELSAP. This framework will have the focus on joint management of 
the Kagera River Basin. The reason for creation of this framework is to improve the 
living-situation for the local people, simultaneously as the environment is protected 
and taken care of (NBI, 2013c).  
 
7.2.2. Benefits from the river 
 
• Electricity generation. 
The most obvious benefit from the project is the electricity generation. Kikagati will, 
compared to Bujagali Hydropower Station with an installed capacity of 250 MW 
(World Bank, 2007), seem like a rather small power station with its 16 MW installed 
capacity and an estimated annual production of 101 GWh (Koksæter, 2011).  
 
However, there is a great demand for more cost effective electricity in both Uganda 
and Tanzania. A possible way of covering this demand is to increase the production 
from thermal power plants. These power plants are very costly to run and create a 
high emission of CO2. In this context, the Kikagati power station is an important 
contribution to meet the market demand.   
 
• Electrification of villages that have yet not been electrified. 
In the area around where Kikagati Station will be constructed lacks electricity. 
Especially on the Tanzanian side, people do not have any electric power. The access 
to electricity is important for the development of a society. The Kikagati/Murongo 
project will lead to the area around the power station becoming increasingly more 
electrified than they have been before. This will lead to economic development and 
growth in the region. It must however be mentioned that even though the Murongo 
area will be electrified, it does not necessarily mean that the local people will have 
electricity delivered to their homes. As there is a lot of poverty in the region, the 
electrification of homes will not be on the top of the list over priorities of the local 
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people. This can be seen from the fact that on the Ugandan side of the Kagera, the 
power grid and supply is all ready fairly well developed. Nevertheless, only eleven 
per cent of the population in the area is connected to the power grid (Ndyabarema et 
al, 2011).  
 
• Stable electricity supply. 
The Kikagati/Murongo project is, in similarity to other small hydropower stations, 
located in a rural area (ERA, 2012). Thus, these small stations play an important role 
in the electrification of rural areas. To get detached from the main grid is well 
prevalent in both Uganda and Tanzania. In this manner small and local power stations 
like Kikagati will give a more stable power supply to the local rural areas. 
Consequently, the electricity supply in the area will be more stable. This means that 
the Kikagati power station will lead to a more stable power supply in the 
Kikagati/Murongo area.  
 
• Small increase in the fish stock  
Even though there will not be constructed a large reservoir in connection to the 
Kikagati power station, there will be constructed a smaller dam. The construction of 
the dam will create a small reservoir behind it. With this as background, it is claimed 
that the small reservoir connected to the Kikagati will lead to an increase in the 
aquatic invertebrate ranges. This again means that there will be more fish, and higher 
fish production (Ndyabarema et al, 2011).  
 
As of today, fishing in the area is done on a dietary supplement basis. Occasionally, 
the fish is sold at local markets and in smaller stores (Laugen et. al., 2011). An 
increase in the fish stock, although probably not be so big, will therefore have a 
positive effect on peoples dietary supplement as well as to an occasional extra 
income. 
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7.2.3. Benefits because of the river 
 
• Play a role in keeping the area peaceful 
Several of the respondents mentioned the cross-border cooperation between the local 
people as a great benefit of the project. The project led the people to cooperate, and 
extend as well as better their relations. The local people in both Uganda and Tanzania 
have a shared interest, which is the finalization of the project. In the collection of the 
research material, it even was mentioned that this local cooperation across the border 
would contribute to keeping the region peaceful.  
 
The area on which the power station will be constructed was during the war between 
Uganda and Tanzania in the late 1970’s a turbulent area (Kiribedda, 2010). After the 
fall of Idi Amin, however, the area became a lot calmer and more peaceful. 
Nevertheless, in the following years, there have been several reports of minor conflicts 
occurring in the Kagera Basin area. These conflicts are mostly revolved around use of 
natural resources and land (Ogol, 2013). Now and then, these conflicts even become 
transboundary. An example of such a conflict might be pastoralists and illegal 
emigrants crossing the border with a large number of livestock. This has led to 
conflict, as local people on one of the side argue it leads to degradation of forest and 
grazing land. (Ogol, 2013). Laws and regulations for these kinds of events do exist, 
weak institutions and insufficient planning makes them ineffective. Thus, more focus 
on the area and an increase in the development rate as a result of electrification will 
contribute to strengthening these institutions, and in turn the laws and regulations 
connected to them. Even though the area is not particularly turbulent, will a 
strengthening of these institutions contribute to keeping the area more peaceful in the 
years to come.  
 
7.2.4. Benefits beyond the river 
 
• Improving the bilateral relations between Uganda and Tanzania. 
The bilateral relation between Tanzania and Uganda is considered as good and 
friendly. This view was supported by several of the respondents for this research. 
Through the EAC an even more tight and intertwined relation between these states is 
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being fostered. Even though the EAC has been the facilitator, it has been up to 
Tanzania and Uganda to do the practical encounter and cooperation. The project 
would not have progressed if it had not been for the willingness of the states. The 
negotiations have not been easy. However, now that the project is starting to come 
into its final stage, and eventually will be finalized, the relations between the two 
states have become better and more positive. Many of the respondents have supported 
this tendency. Thus, the bettering and strengthening of the bilateral relations between 
Uganda and Tanzania can be seen as an additional benefit of deriving from the 
project.  
 
• Strengthening the development of the East African Community 
The Kikagati/Murongo project has suffered from the fact that the EAC has not yet 
reached deeper integration. The East African Community, on the other hand, has had 
great benefit from working on the project, as it has become more experienced through 
this progress. Several actors have argued that the EAC is better on paper than in 
reality. The major issue in the case of Kikagati/Murongo is that the frameworks of the 
institution have been to loose in order to be implemented. Nevertheless, there are 
many good thoughts behind the EAC, and in the future it might become a strong and 
effective institution. On the way there, projects such as the Kikagati/Murongo project 
will help the EAC to improve its implementation capacity and ability.  
 
An analysis of possible benefits from the project might have shown the parties that 
there are other benefits of such a project besides the gain of electricity. This might 
have made the parties see that there is more than one benefit deriving from the 
project. Consequently, the willingness to cooperate in order to finalize the project 
might have been greater.  
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Chapter 8. CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis has had focus on describing the Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project 
from the initiation of the project to the point of a final agreement. By having such a 
focus, this research has given a real life example of the realities of transboundary 
water management.  
 
The main research questions were followed and answered through out this thesis, in 
order to address the project in the best possible way. These questions were 1: What 
role have the different actors in the project played, and how have they affected the 
project. 2: What challenges have there been for the project? 3: What is the motivation 
for the states to cooperate and reach an agreement?  
 
The three previous chapters of this research have shown that there have been a 
number of actors involved in The Kikagati/Murongo Hydropower Project. None of 
these actors have had any experience with projects like this before. A project like this 
has a broad dimension and many different institutions involved in it. Moreover, these 
institutions have had their own views and opinions on how the project should evolve, 
and what was best for its development. Some of the institution and actors changed 
their views as the project evolved and negotiations were being carried out. 
Consequently, this led to agreements, which had previously been made, to fall apart 
and be renegotiated. This background created loads of frustration not only for the 
developer, but also for all of the other actors involved in the project. Moreover, some 
of the actors involved would likely say that the delay in negotiations made the project 
take significantly longer time than it should. 
 
There is no doubt about that the number of actors involved, as well as their lack of 
experience, created challenges for the project. Nevertheless, the greatest of challenges 
is probably that the project was initiated as a unilateral Ugandan project. This 
background has complicated the negotiations with Tanzania, as they at times have felt 
as not an equal part in the project. Besides from this, the progress of the project has 
been further complicated by lack of usable frameworks.  Thus, the national laws of 
the two states had to be used. This made it necessary for the developer to duplicate the 
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process in order to acquire necessary permissions.  
 
Despite the challenges within the project, the parties have continued the work towards 
reaching agreement. For the developer, the motivation to continue with the project is 
economic gain. As for the partner states, the main motivation is to cooperate on the 
production of electricity in order to being able to cover the rapidly growing demand. 
Further on, it has been mentioned that the Kikagati/Murongo project will lead to a 
stable power supply in the region as well as electrification of areas previously not 
electrified. This has eventually uncovered a number of additional benefits of the 
project. These are benefits such as increased focus on the river might lead to a better 
environmental protection of it, stable and reliable access to electricity will lead to 
socioeconomic development and last but not least strengthening of the bilateral 
relationship between Tanzania and Uganda. The facilitator, East African 
Community’s lack of experience and implementation ability has been an additional 
obstacle for the progress of the project. Nevertheless, the project has contributed 
positively in a way that has strengthened the EAC for the future. It must also be 
mentioned that an analysis of possible benefits from and barriers to the project should 
have been done prior to the initiation of it, so that it would have been easier to carry 
the project out.  
 
Based on the Kikagati/Murongo project, it is possible to make three points that can be 
applied to other transboundary water management projects. The primary point 
encounters solely when commercial actor is involved, while the remaining two, can 
be applied to all cooperative transboundary water managements.   
 
• There should be regional cooperative framework in place before giving out 
licenses to private developers.   
• The states should behave like they are equal partners. 
• The benefits from cooperating should be perceived to be fair.  
 
Transboundary water management can be a lengthy and challenging process. It 
involves negotiation between sovereign states, often with separate or conflicting 
interests. This is something everyone concerned with transboundary water should be 
aware of and have in mind, also private developers, like those who have been 
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Involved in the Kikagati/Murongo project. If there is little time or patience with 
initiating the project, the importance of making sure there is a solid framework to 
develop the project within is essential. In other words, a framework with good 
enforcement mechanisms, and that can be used, must be in place. 
 
To conclude with Albert Einstein’s words, “We can not solve problems by using the 
same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” This is true for transboundary 
water management in general, and for the Kikagati/Murongo case in specific. 
Transboundary river management encompasses the importance of being able to going 
beyond thinking national, towards thinking transnational. Despite the cooperation on 
shared water resources often being motivated by national benefits, it is important to 
acknowledge that many of the benefits possible to gain are reachable only through 
cooperation with other states. This was not the case for the Kikagati/Murongo project 
in the beginning as Uganda decided to run it as a unilateral project. This created 
dissatisfaction for the Tanzanian authorities. However, when cooperation was 
established, and a common dialogue was in place, the involved parties have reached a 
solution everyone can consider being satisfying.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 Appendix A  
List of informants  
Ugandan Officials 
Abu Moki Assistant Commissioner for 
Economic Affairs 
Ministry of East African 
Community Affairs 
Atama Gabriel Principal Infrastructure Officer Ministry of East African 
Community Affairs 
James Banabe Acting Commissioner for 
Energy Resources Department  
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development 
Jackson Twinomujuni Assistant Commissioner, Water 
Resources Use, Planning and 
Regulation 
Ministry of Water and 
Environment 
Waiswa Ayazika Arnold Director Environmental 
Monitoring & Compliance 
National Environment 
Management Authority (NEMA) 
James Philip Sempeguya  Statistician Electricity Regulatory Authority 
(ERA)  
Valentine Katabira Manager, Operation and 
Maintenance 
Uganda Electricity Transmission 
Company Ltd (UETCL) 
Tanzanian Officials 
Abdillah Mataka Assistant Director, Economic & 
Social Infrastructure Division 
Ministry of East African 
Cooperation  
Samuel I. Mgweno Energy Engineer Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
Kamugenyi Luteganya Environmental Consultant National Environmental 
Management Council (NEMC) 
Anastas P. Mbawala Director of Electricity Energy and Water Utilities 
Regulatory Authority (EWURA) 
Kasindi Malale  Principal Engineer  Tanzania Electric Supply 
Company Limited (TANESCO) 
Other 
Inge Stølen Senior Director, International 
Business Development 
TrønderEnergi 
Busingye Annicent General Manager TronderPower Ltd 
Peter N. Kinuthia Senior Energy Officer East African Community 
Secretariat 
Desire Nzayanga Program Officer Power Projects Nile Basin Initiative 
Eivind Fjeldstad Managing Director Norwegian-African Business 
Association (NABA) 
Elaine Kiew Former project manager China Shan Sheng Uganda 
International Co. Ltd  
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Appendix B 	  
Selection from interview guide 
 
(Question addressed to all government officials.)  
 
• In which way have (organization) been involved in the Kikagati/Murongo project?   
 
• This is a transboundary project. How have you been cooperating with 
(organization/organizations) in (Tanzania/Uganda)? 
 
• Seen from the (organization) side, what will you say have been the biggest 
challenges/difficulties related to this project?  
 
• Can you also point at some benefits from the project? 
 
• The project first started in Uganda without Tanzania being involved from the 
beginning of. In which way has this affected the project and the negotiations 
between the two states? What specific effect would you say this had on the work 
with the Project? 
 
• A project like this might be both challenging and rewarding. Can you please specify 
the motivation for (Tanzania/Uganda) to cooperate and the mechanism behind the 
cooperation between the two states?  
   
• How will you evaluate (Tanzania’s/Uganda’s) involvement in the project compared 
to (Tanzania/Uganda)? Both in a historical context and in the future.   
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Appendix C 	  
Memorandum of Understanding 
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Appendix D 
Bilateral Agreement 	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